



T H E

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JOURNAL of the PROCEEDINGS and DEBATES in the  
POLITICAL CLUB, continued from Page 387.

*In the Debate begun in our last, the next Speech I shall give was that made by Quintus Mucius, in the Character of the Hon. William Murray, Esq; which was to this Effect.*

Mr. President,  
S I R,



**A**S the Post in which I have the Honour to serve his Majesty, has no Concern with foreign Affairs, and as I am not so unreasonable as to expect, much less desire, that Ministers should communicate to me those Secrets which the Duty of their Office requires them to conceal, I can know nothing of our publick Measures, with Regard to foreign Affairs, but what is, or may be known to every Gentleman in this House. I, indeed, know nothing of those Measures but what I have learned from publick Gazettes, or from Papers already laid before us; and yet, I think, I know enough for warranting my giving my Consent to this Motion. The Support of the House of *Austria*,

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and the increasfing, or at least preserving as intire as possible the Power of that House, is a Maxim that has been long held sacred by all those Potentates, that are, or may be in Danger from the overgrown Power **A** of the House of *Bourbon*; and Experience has shewn it to be a right Maxim. Can it be said, that the Power of the House of *Bourbon* has been lately diminished, and that therefore we need not now be so anxious about preserving the Power **B** of the House of *Austria*? On the contrary, we must know, without being let into any of the Secrets of the Cabinet, that the Power of the former has been but very lately increased, and that of the latter diminished; and we must likewise know, **C** that had it not been for the seasonable Interposition of this Nation, the Power of the House of *Austria* would before this Time have been utterly abolished, and that of the House of *Bourbon* raised above Controul: We must therefore either depart from the most sacred Maxim of our Ancestors, or we must continue that Interposition, till the House of *Austria* be secured against the Fears of a farther Dimi-  
L I I nution,

nution, and the House of *Bourbon* deprived of the Hopes of any farther Increase. This, Sir, I take to be the End of our present Measures, with regard to foreign Affairs: This we may discover without any extraordinary Knowledge, and this is what I most heartily approve of.

I believe, Sir, there is no Gentleman in this House who will say, that we ought not to endeavour to obtain this End, if possible; but it is said, that we might have obtained this End before we sent any of our Troops abroad. Both the *Emperor* and the *French*, they say, would have agreed to restore the Tranquillity of *Germany*, as soon as they found themselves abandoned by *Prussia* and *Saxony*, upon the single Condition of the *Emperor's* being restored to his hereditary Dominions. This some Gentlemen are pleased to assert very positively, but hitherto without shewing the least Foundation for what they assert. Even our publick *Gazettes* have never yet furnished us with any Ground for such an Assertion. They have, indeed, told us, that after the *French* Troops were inclosed in *Prague*, and the Queen of *Hungary* every where victorious in *Germany*, and after the *French* began to dread an Attack upon their own Frontier by the landing of our Troops in *Flanders*, they then thought fit to offer Terms to that Princess; but if common News-Papers must be taken for Authority as to this Fact, I hope they will likewise be taken for Authority as to the Terms that were offered; and if our common News-Papers are to be believed, the Terms offered were such as she could not accept of; for she was not only to restore the *Emperor* to his hereditary Dominions, but to put him in Possession of all those Fortresses that were the Keys of her own, by which it was evident, that the *Emperor* and *France* wanted only a little Time, and an Opportunity to get out of the

Perplexity their Affairs were then involved in, in order to attack her with the greater Facility, as soon as they had recovered; and in the mean Time she was to remain involved in a War with the *Spaniards* and *French* in *Italy*, with a Design certainly, that she might be obliged to send all her Forces into that Country, and leave her *German* Dominions exposed to an Attack from the *Emperor*, as soon as he should find himself in a Condition to begin it.

But suppose it to be true, Sir, that the *French* at that Time desired no other Condition for restoring the Tranquillity of *Germany*, than that of restoring the *Emperor* to his hereditary Dominions, and that they had really no Design to renew the War in *Germany* with the first Opportunity; yet even in this Case, we were in the Right to advise the Queen of *Hungary* not to accept of the Terms offered. Let us consider, Sir, that the Assistance we now give to the Queen of *Hungary* is not merely on her own Account, nor on Account of preserving the Balance of Power; it is on our own particular Account as much as any other. From what passed between the *French* and us, with regard to *Spain*, before the late *Emperor's* Death, every Gentleman must know, that had it not been for that Accident, we should certainly have been involved in a War with *France* as well as *Spain*; and however much superior our naval Power may at present be to the naval Power of both these Nations, yet if neither of them had any Thing to fear by Land: If both could, without Interruption from any of their Neighbours upon the Continent, convert their vast Revenues and numerous Armies towards increasing their naval Power, it is much to be feared, that in a few Years it would become superior to ours. The only Way by which we can prevent this, is to keep them always involved, or



in Danger of being involved in a Land War; and therefore we were, and will be in the Right to keep *France* and *Spain* involved in a War with the Queen of *Hungary*, till we can compel the *Spanish* Court to give up the insolent Claims they have of late Years set up against us, and to agree to such Terms as may secure the Freedom of our Trade and Navigation for the future, one of which must be a Satisfaction for the many Depredations committed by them upon our Merchants, under Colour of searching and seizing their Ships on Account of contraband Goods.

When we reflect upon this, Sir, let us consider what a dangerous Situation we should have been in, had the Queen of *Hungary* made Peace with *France* and *Spain* without stipulating any Thing in our Favour, especially if she had been compelled to do so, by our refusing to give her any farther Assistance. The War would have continued between *Spain* and us, and *France* would certainly have declared openly against us, as soon as she had repaired and sufficiently increased her Navy. Both Nations would then have been without Fear of any Attack upon the Continent, and therefore would have applied themselves solely to the increasing of their naval Power. From this we had the most fatal Consequences to apprehend; for as it would have been absolutely necessary for us to divide our naval Force, in order to protect our Possessions in *America* and the *Mediterranean*, as well as to guard against an Invasion at home, it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for us to prevent our being overpowered some where or other; and one signal Misfortune of this Kind might have rendered our Enemies Masters at Sea, which would have obliged us to submit to any Terms they pleased to impose.

Thus, Sir, it is manifest, that, if the Terms offered by the *Emperor* and *France* had been really such as have been represented, it would have been against our Interest, and inconsistent with our Safety, to have compelled the Queen of *Hungary* to accept of them; and the general Interest of *Europe*, as well as the Justice of her Cause, would even in this Case have been an additional Argument for our advising and enabling her to reject the Terms offered; for however much the Project of an Equivalent may be ridiculed by some Gentlemen, to me it appears neither impossible nor impracticable; and as *France* has been the chief Author of all the Troubles, Misfortunes and Losses she has met with, there is nothing more just than that *France* should be made to give an Equivalent for what she has been obliged to yield to *Prussia*, *Saxony* and *Sardinia*. She has certainly a most equitable Claim for such an Equivalent from some of the Branches of the House of *Bourbon*; and, I believe, it will be granted, that the obtaining of such an Equivalent would be the best Method for restoring and establishing a Balance of Power in *Europe*. That Balance must still depend upon a Confederacy, but the House of *Austria* must still be, as it has been, a principal Member of that Confederacy; for without the House of *Austria*, I believe, it would be almost impossible to form such a Confederacy. Therefore, not only our own Interest, but also the Interest of *Europe*, and the Justice of the Queen of *Hungary's* Cause, oblige us to assist her in obtaining such an Equivalent; and from my present View of Things, I cannot think it appears to be impossible. We have already restored the Tranquillity of *Germany* without coming to any Terms with *France*: We have already reduced that Nation to the Necessity of thinking only of the Defence of their own

Frontier; and in the present State they are in, it is probable they will not long be able to make that Defence good. They have been impoverished by an expensive and unsuccessful War, their People are groaning under most grievous and heavy Taxes, so that they have not now so much as one Necessary of Life remaining untaxed: In such Circumstances can we suppose, that they will be long able to keep such numerous Armies upon their Frontiers, as the Queen of *Hungary* will, with our Assistance, be enabled to bring against them? And as they have already lost most of their veteran Soldiers, one single Defeat would deprive them of all Power of Resistance, which would enable her to take, and oblige them to leave her in Possession of whatever Equivalent we might think proper.

I hope, Sir, I have fully justified the End we propose in assisting the Queen of *Hungary*: I hope, I have shewn, that it is not only just, but necessary, for us to give that Princess our utmost Assistance, even in obtaining from the House of *Bourbon* an Equivalent for the Losses and Misfortunes that have been brought upon her chiefly by their Means. And now with regard to the Manner in which we ought to assist her: It is certain we must, and ought to assist her with our Money and our Navy; but this is not all: In my Opinion, we must likewise assist her with our Troops; because it will be a convincing Proof, that we are in earnest, and fully resolved to assist her to the utmost of our Power. The Resolutions of Princes and States are generally more governed by their Hopes and Fears than by their Reason; and our appearing so heartily in Favour of that Princess, as to assist her with our Troops as well as our Money and Navy, will raise the Hopes of those who incline to be her Friends, and increase the Fears

of those who incline to be her Enemies. This may induce some of the Potentates of *Europe* to declare openly in her Favour, who would otherwise remain neutral; and it may oblige some to remain neutral, who would otherwise declare openly against her. The Argument that has been made use of in this Debate, for shewing the Impossibility of procuring an Equivalent for the Queen of *Hungary*, is a strong Argument for our assisting her with Troops as well as Money. To shew this Impossibility, it has been said, that most of the Princes of *Germany* are now jealous of the Power of the House of *Austria*, and will join with *France* against us, rather than see the Power of that House increased by any new Conquests made upon *France*. For my own Part, I believe, that those Princes of *Germany* that seem inclined to appear against the Queen of *Hungary*, are more governed by Avarice than Jealousy; but if they really have any such Jealousy, it is a most unreasonable one, and if it cannot be removed, it must be bridled, which we can do no other Way but by convincing them, that we are resolved to support the House of *Austria* to the utmost of our Power; and for this Purpose we must make use of our Troops as well as our Money and Ships of War. This will make it appear dangerous for them to join openly with *France* against us, by which Means we shall make their Fear a Curb for their Jealousy, and by the same Means we may remove the Apprehensions of those who now incline to be our Friends; and their declaring openly in our Favour will increase the Fears of those whose Jealousy might otherwise induce them to declare openly against us.

Thus, Sir, our assisting the Queen of *Hungary* with Troops, as well as Money and Ships of War, must contribute greatly towards attaining that End,



End, which I have shewn to be just, and even necessary for this Nation in its present Circumstances; and the only plausible Objection I have heard against it, is founded upon a Supposition which I cannot admit. It has been said, Sir, that the Queen of Hungary has Men enough, and wants nothing but Money to arm and support them; and that therefore we ought to supply her with Money instead of Troops, because what we pay for maintaining our Troops abroad, would maintain a much greater Number of Troops raised in her own Dominions. I shall grant, Sir, that the Bravery and Fidelity of her Subjects have furnished her with a much greater Number of Troops than could have been expected; but no Man who knows any Thing of Geography can, I think, suppose, that she has as many Men in her Dominions as there are in the two large Kingdoms of France and Spain; for every one knows, they are neither so extensive nor so populous, consequently she must at last want Men as well as Money; and tho' our Troops are a little more expensive than hers, yet the Difference is not so great as has been represented; for tho' by Treaties the Expence of 1000 Foot has been computed and settled at the Rate of 10,000 *Florins per Month*, we cannot suppose that 1000 Men, even of the Queen of Hungary's Troops, could be maintained for that Sum, without any additional Expence, either for Cloathing, Waggon-Money, or any other incidental Charge; therefore she could not maintain any great Number of her Troops more than we could maintain of ours for the same Sum; and if her Dominions cannot furnish Men enough for supporting a War against the numerous Armies of France and Spain, we must assist her with Troops as well as Money, let the Difference in the Expence be what it will.

The Necessity of the Thing, Sir, will likewise be an Answer to the other Objection, I have heard made against our furnishing the Queen of Hungary with any of our Troops, I mean, that of its being dangerous to our Constitution, by obliging us to have a great Number of our People bred up to depend upon the Soldier Trade alone for a Livelihood; for supposing that there were any real Danger in this, when it becomes necessary for our Preservation, it is an Evil that, like many others, must be submitted to. But I must think the Danger rather imaginary than real: The Trade of a common Soldier is not so desirable or profitable a Trade as to make Men chuse to depend on it solely for their Subsistence: There are very few that take it up by Choice; and most Men are glad to quit it, as soon as they can get Leave to do so. We may therefore most reasonably suppose, that the much greatest Part of the Men we send abroad, would be glad to return to their former Employments at the End of the War, and such as did not chuse to do so, might be disposed of among those Corps that we are obliged to keep in Pay for our Defence and Security, even in Time of Peace. For this Reason, I shall always think, it will be an Advantage to us, and even a Security to our Constitution, to send a Number of our own Troops abroad, as often as we have Occasion to employ any Troops upon the Continent for the Assistance of our Allies; because, by this Means, we shall always have among us a great Number of Men who are not only Masters of military Discipline, but have been actually engaged in Action, and, consequently, may be called Veteran, as well as well-disciplined Soldiers, which can never be the Case of our Militia, let them be never so well disciplined: At least, I hope so, because it can never be

be the Case, except when we are, or have lately been engaged in a Civil War amongst ourselves. And an ambitious Government, even with an Army at its Command, can never destroy our Constitution, as long as we have among our People a great Number of veteran, as well as well-disciplined Soldiers; for this I take to be a better Security for the Liberties of the People, than any Regulations that were ever invented by any human Sagacity, because we never heard of a People's being enslaved, as long as they had Arms in their Hands, and Courage and Skill enough to make the proper Use of them.

I shall, lastly, consider the Place where our Troops ought to be employed; and this, Sir, I must observe, is not to be decided by the present Question, nor can it be decided by any Question in this House, or at this Time. It is a Question that must be left intirely to the Decision of our Generals, in conjunction with those of our Allies; and even by them it cannot be decided till the Time of Action draws near. As for Winter Quarters, *Flanders* was certainly the best Place, and, indeed, the only Place where our Troops could safely take up their Winter Quarters, unless they had marched with the *Austrian* Troops quite away to *Bavaria* or *Bohemia*. Their not taking up their Winter Quarters upon this Side of the *Rhine*, was not owing, I believe, to any Objection's being made to it by the Princes or Circles of the Empire, but to their not having any fortified Towns there for securing them in their Quarters. They must have been continually exposed to the Inroads of the Enemies *Hussars* and *Partisans*, and therefore, it was necessary for them to return to *Flanders*, or to march as far as *Bavaria*, the latter of which would have been extremely inconvenient, because we could not, with Safety, have sent them any Recruits or Reinforcement; and as the *French* would,

in the Winter Time, have taken Possession of all that Part of *Germany* on this Side the *Rhine*, our Troops, as well as the Queen of *Hungary's*, would have been subjected to the Difficulty of passing that River in the Face of a *French* Army, before they could open the Campaign, or undertake any Thing against the common Enemy.

Whether our Troops are to be employed next Campaign in *Flanders*, or whether they ought to be employed there, are Questions which I shall not pretend to Answer; but this I will say, Sir, that *Flanders* is certainly the most convenient Place, with Respect to us, for attacking the Frontiers of *France*; and if the *Dutch* join either as Principals or Auxiliaries, it will be absolutely necessary to have a considerable Army in *Flanders*: Nay, I believe, they will take Care not to join in any Shape, if they are not previously assured of having an Army formed there, sufficient to protect their Barrier against the most powerful Army *France* can send against it. But as this is not the Question now properly before us, I shall enlarge no futher upon the Subject. The real and, indeed, the sole Question now before us, is, Whether we ought to give the Queen of *Hungary* any Assistance; for if we are to give her any, we certainly ought to give her the most effectual Assistance we can; which we cannot do, unless we assist her with our Troops as well as our Money and Navy. This, I say, is the sole Question now under our Consideration; and as this is a Question which, in my Opinion, can admit of no Dispute, I shall therefore most heartily agree with the Hon. Gentleman in his Motion.

The next that spoke upon this Subject was Cn. Norbanus, in the Character of Norreys Bertie, Esq; whose Speech was in Substance thus.

Mr.



Mr. President,

S I R,

THO' I have not long had the Honour to sit in this House, yet, as I dissent from the Hon. Gentleman who spoke last, I shall most humbly beg Leave to speak my Sentiments, and hope it will not be thought Presumption in me.

The Hon. Gentleman was pleased to say, *That the French were much impoverished, and not able to support the Expence of a long War, and assigned as a Reason for it, That the Subjects of France groaned under most grievous and heavy Taxes, insomuch that there was not one Necessary of Life left untaxed.* The Poverty of our Neighbours adds but little to our Riches; and tho' Comparisons are at all Times odious, yet, I am afraid, if the Riches of a Nation depend on its Subjects being but lightly taxed, that we ourselves are, in that Respect, very near in the same Situation with our Neighbours the French.

Another Hon. Gentleman has also informed us, *That our Woollen Trade is of late much increased:* If so, as most of our Regiments have been supplied with Recruits from those Towns in the West, where that Manufacture chiefly flourishes, I think, there can be no better Time to disband Part of the Army, because there may now be a Want of Hands in that Manufacture. This I mention, because he said very emphatically, *What will the Men do, if we disband them?* An Argument that may be made use of, even in Times of the most profound Peace; and likewise, because it is well known, that her Majesty of Hungary wants not Men but Money, and that Half the Money those Troops cost us, would be of more Service to her. I think it will be better to send her Money, as it will save the Lives of many of our able-bodied Artizans and laborious Poor,

by the Numbers of which the Riches of every Nation must be estimated, and, consequently, we ought to esteem their Lives invaluable, and not squander away their Blood in a War on the Continent, which can be of no Service to Great Britain. These, and many other Reasons, which I have heard from Gentlemen of more Experience and greater Abilities than myself, induce me to give my Negative to the Question.

B The next Speech I shall give was that made by Servilius Priscus, in the Character of the Hon. Henry Pelham, Esq; which was to the following Effect, viz.

Mr. President,

S I R,

WHEN I call to remembrance the Reproaches that have been, and are still daily thrown out against our Ministers, for not assisting the late Emperor in the Year 1734, when he was attacked by France, Spain, and Sardinia; and when I reflect on the Ardor that was shewn by all Ranks and Degrees of Men in this Nation for assisting the Queen of Hungary, when she was attack'd by the King of Prussia, single and alone, I cannot but be surprized at the Opposition that is now made to every Step taken by our Government for assisting that magnanimous and much injured Princess. Considering the solemn Treaties now subsisting between us and the House of Austria, and considering how much our Honour is engaged not to allow the Court of Spain to make any Conquests in Italy, while they are at open War with us, I believe, no Gentleman will say, and, I think, it has not been as yet directly affirmed, that we ought not to give her any Assistance. If then we are to give her Assistance, must we not give her, if we can, such Assistance as will be effectual; and ought

ought we not to give it in that Manner which will be most effectual? For my own Part, rather than not give her such an Assistance as will be effectual for the Ends proposed, I should be for giving her no Assistance at all; because, by giving her an ineffectual Assistance, we shall do her no Service, we shall only increase her Misfortunes, and besides a certain and heavy Expence, we may bring great Misfortunes upon ourselves, by rousing the Resentment of the Conquerors, and bringing their united Force against this Nation alone, after the Queen of *Hungary* has been, by our ill-timed Oeconomy, obliged to submit to the Terms they prescribe.

must therefore be of Opinion, Sir, that we are bound in Honour, as well as Interest, to give the Queen of *Hungary* not only our Assistance, but all the Assistance we are able, and in that Manner which will be most effectual for procuring her a safe and solid Peace, without any further Diminution of her Dominions, but rather with an Increase, if Success should give us any reasonable Hopes of being able to accomplish it. If this be what we are bound to do then, I think, it is evident, that we ought to assist her both with Troops and Money; for that both Troops and Money will be more effectual than Money alone, we have not only the Reason of the Thing, but the Experience of past Times to convince us. Queen *Elizabeth*, it seems, never thought that Money would do as well as Troops; for when she undertook the Support of the *United Provinces*, she assisted them with Men as well as Money; and the Assistance she gave to *Henry* the IVth, and the Protestants of *France*, consisted chiefly in Troops, tho' both the *United Provinces* and the King of *France* might have had Men enough from *Germany*; and consequently, if Money had been then

thought as good as Troops, she had no Occasion to send any Troops to the Assistance of either: But that wise Queen thought otherwise, and therefore she seemed always more forward to assist her Allies with Troops than with Money. I need not mention particularly any more Instances of this Kind, for it is well known, that in all the foreign Broils we were ever concerned in, we sent Troops to the Assistance of our Allies; and those Troops always gained Honour to their Country by their Conduct and Bravery; which I mention not merely out of Vanity or Ostentation, but to shew, that a Body of *English* Troops will always be of more Service to any of our Allies, by the Confidence it gives to their Armies, and the Terror it spreads amongst their Enemies, than if we were to send them double the Sum we pay for the Subsistence of those Troops. I repeat it, Sir, because I think it of great Weight in this Debate: The Troops we have from Time to Time sent abroad, have always gained such a Reputation, as gives Confidence to their Friends and Dismay to their Enemies: They have hitherto preserved this Reputation: I hope, they will always preserve it; and this will always make a Body of *English* Troops of greater Service to the Cause we are engaged in, than if we were to send Money sufficient for subsisting double their Number.

From hence, Sir, I must conclude, that if we are to assist the Queen of *Hungary* as far, and in the best Manner we are able, we must assist her with Troops as well as Money; and as our having an Army upon the Continent may prevail upon some of the Powers of *Europe* to declare in her Favour, and may prevent others from declaring against her, I must approve of what my Hon. Friend has been pleased to propose, and, I hope, it will meet with the

Appro-



Approbation of a great Majority of this House.

*The next Speech I shall give in this Debate, was that made by L. Volumnus, in the Character of Edmund Waller, Esq; the Purport of A which was as follows, viz.*

Mr. President,

S I R,

**I**F Experience had not taught me to be surpris'd at nothing that happens in this House, I should have been very much surpris'd at hearing it asserted in this Debate, that an Opposition has been made to every Step taken by our Government for supporting the Queen of Hungary. Has there an Opposition been made to any one Step taken by our Government for that Purpose, except the single one of sending our Troops abroad, in order to form an Army in Flanders? And was not the Reason given for that Opposition, because an Army formed there, without the Concurrence of the Dutch could be of no Service to the Queen of Hungary, nor could be designed for any Thing else but to amuse the unthinking Part of this Nation, in order to draw them in to the Maintaining of 16000 Hanoverians? Have not all the Subsidies propos'd for the Queen of Hungary been almost unanimously agreed to? Has any one found fault with the Service our Squadron in the Mediterranean has rendered to her, or to her Ally the King of Sardinia? Has not every impartial Man, both within Doors and without exclaimed vehemently against our suffering the Spaniards to transport an Army for invading her Dominions in Italy? After all this, it is really astonishing to hear it asserted in the Face of such an august Assembly, that our Government has been oppos'd in every Step they have taken for the Support of the Queen of Hungary.

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On the contrary, Sir, all the Opposition our Ministers have met with for above these twenty Years, with regard to foreign Affairs, has been occasioned by the Steps they have taken for destroying or weakening the House of Austria, and exalting that of Bourbon; for this seems to have been their Design ever since the Year 1720, when the late Emperor first began to obstruct the Views of the Court of Hanover upon the Duchy of Mecklembourg. This Dispute between the Courts of Vienna and Hanover soon produced a very remarkable Effect upon the Councils of Great Britain, by making them so fond of concluding a separate Peace with Spain, that they sacrific'd all the Demands of their Country upon that Crown, and most dishonourably gave it a Foundation for insisting, not only upon the Restitution of Gibraltar, but upon having Satisfaction for the Spanish Ships we destroyed in 1718. These were the Fruits of our Negotiation and Treaty with Spain in 1721, by which we left the House of Austria to make up their Differences with Spain in the best Manner they could; and this was the first Piece of Resentment shewn by the Court of Hanover against the late Emperor, for traversing their Views upon the Duchy of Mecklembourg. The second was, the Treaty of Hanover in the Year 1725, by which we joined in an Alliance with France against the Emperor and Spain. The third was the Treaty of Seville, by which we joined in an Alliance with France and Spain, for compelling the Emperor to admit of Spanish Troops into Italy; and the fourth was our deserting him in the Year 1734, by which Naples and Sicily, and likewise, I may say Lorrain were taken from the House of Austria and given to the House of Bourbon.

These, Sir, were the Steps taken  
M m m by

by our Ministers during the late *Emperor's* Life-Time: These are the Steps that have been opposed or complained of; and I wonder to hear any Gentleman, who approved, and, perhaps, forwarded these Steps: I say, I wonder to hear any such Gentleman now pretend, that he has a disinterested and sincere Zeal for the Support of the Queen of *Hungary*. When I hear such Pretences set up by such Gentlemen, and when I consider by what their Conduct has been chiefly influenced for many Years past, I cannot avoid having a Suspicion, that this mighty Zeal for the Support of the Queen of *Hungary* is now made use of as a Cloak for covering some Designs that are not fit for being exposed to vulgar Eyes: I mean such as will not view every Thing through those false Glasses set before them by Ministers. In order to justify this Suspicion, and to shew that it is not quite void of Foundation, I must beg Leave to examine our Conduct since the late *Emperor's* Death. Our Ministers began, it is true, to shew a mighty Zeal for the Support of the Queen of *Hungary*, when she was first attacked by the King of *Prussia*; but every one now knows, and we have authentick Papers upon our Table, which explain the true Cause of that seeming Zeal: From those Papers it appears, that our Ministers had then a View of getting with Ease, and without Danger, some Part of the *Prussian* Dominions added to the Electorate of *Hanover*; and that this was the true Cause of the Zeal they pretended, is, I think, evident, from its cooling all of a Sudden, as soon as they found that *Prussia* would be supported by *France* and *Spain*, as well as several of the Princes of *Germany*. Whilst we had this View before our Eyes, nothing would serve us but compelling *Prussia*, by Force of Arms, to desist from his rash Enterprize; and for this Purpose the Troops of *Hanover* were augmented, and the

*Danes* and *Hessians* taken into *British* Pay. But no sooner did this View vanish, or as soon as we saw that the Accomplishment of this Design would be liable to great Uncertainty, Difficulty, and Danger, we gave over all Thoughts of supporting the Queen of *Hungary*, any other Way than by granting her a small Subsidy, which, according to what has been said by the Advocates for this Question, we ought not to have done; for according to what these Gentlemen now say, we ought either to give her such Assistance as will be effectual, or none at all. Their Way of thinking at that Time must therefore have been very different from what it is now, or otherwise they must admit what has been often observed, that Ministers are ready to embrace every Opportunity for squeezing Money from the People, whether they think it will be of any Advantage to the Nation or no; because, as it must pass through, some of it will always stick to their Fingers, or to the Fingers of some of their Favourites.

Whatever may be in this, Sir, it is certain, our Ministers gave over all Thoughts of assisting the Queen of *Hungary*, any other Way than with the Money granted her by Parliament; and in this Resolution they continued till the unexpected Success of her Arms, and the haughty, as well as bad Conduct of the *French* Generals quite changed the Face of Affairs in *Germany*. Upon this our Ministers began again to reassume their seeming Zeal for assisting the Queen of *Hungary*, and supporting the House of *Austria*, tho' it was not now near so much the Interest of this Nation to support the Power of that House, as it was at the Beginning of the War; because the Imperial Dignity was irrecoverably gone to another Family, and, consequently, the House of *Austria* could no longer be set up as a Rival to the House



House of Bourbon. This the *French* knew very well, and therefore, I am convinced, that as soon as they found themselves deserted by *Prussia* and *Saxony*, it would have been very easy to restore the Peace of *Europe*, as well as *Germany*, if the Queen of *A Hungary* would have rested satisfied with all her paternal Dominions not then yielded by her to others; but an Equivalent began then to be thought of, and this Nation was to be loaded with the chief Part of the Expence in obtaining it.

Could our Ministers, Sir, be serious in such a Project? Could they think it possible for us and the Queen of *Hungary* to accomplish it? And if it had been possible, could they think it was the Interest of this Nation to engage in it? No, Sir, I am convinced of the contrary, and therefore I must suppose, they had something else in View. What it is, I shall not pretend to determine precisely; but from their former Conduct, I believe, I may pretend to guess, and shall leave it to Gentle-  
men, to consider whether they have Reason to think I guess right. We know the Power which the *Emperor* and *Diet* have over the several States that compose the *Germanick* Body: We know, that by the Authority of the *Emperor* and *Diet*, free Cities may be disfranchised, and Ecclesiastical States secularised, and given to neighbouring Princes or Electors: Suppose the Court of *Hanover* had a Mind to have something like this done in their Favour: Could they take a better Method for obtaining it, than by encouraging the Queen of *Hungary* to refuse restoring the *Empe-*  
ror to his hereditary Dominions, and to carry the War into *France*, in order to take from that Kingdom an Equivalent for what she has lost in *Germany*? And if they could prevail upon our Ministers to promise her the utmost Assistance of this Nation, would it not be the best Method they

could take for encouraging her to embark in such a Project?

I am far from affirming, Sir, that this is really the Case; but if it is, let us consider the Situation this Nation or the Queen of *Hungary* may be in. If we meet with great Success in the War against *France*, the *Emperor* must submit to what the Court of *Hanover* insists on, and then the Queen of *Hungary* will be left to carry on the War by herself, or must accept of such Terms as that Court shall make for her: If we meet with bad Success, the Queen of *Hungary* must submit to such Terms as the *French* shall prescribe, and in order to pacify the Resentment of the *Emperor* our Ministers may be prevailed on to make Sacrifices to *France* and *Spain*, which would very ill suit with the Honour or Interest of *Great-Britain*.

But now, Sir, to suppose that our Ministers are really serious; that they have no secret Views; that they think it for the Interest of this Nation to be at the Expence of obtaining an Equivalent from the House of *Bourbon*, for what the Queen of *Hungary* has yielded to *Prussia*, *Saxony* and *Sardinia*; and that they think it possible for the Queen of *Hungary* to succeed in this Scheme with the Assistance of this Nation alone; yet they cannot desire those Gentlemen to concur in their Measures, who happen to be of a quite different Opinion; and as I am one of them that are so, I hope, they will excuse my concurring with them in running my Country into a Project where I think it may meet with Ruin, but can expect no Success. An Honourable and Learned Gentleman has, indeed, endeavoured to shew the Feasibility of this Project, by representing *France* to be in the greatest Distress; but in my Opinion, he presented us with a Picture rather of this Kingdom than that of *France* and when he said, *that nothing re-*  
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*maintained untaxed*, if he had added, *nor any Tax unmortgaged*, the Picture would have been to the Life. In these Circumstances, can we propose to make Conquests for ourselves, much less for others, upon such a powerful Kingdom as *France*, when supported by *Spain* and the *Emperor of Germany*? But what makes the Project still more ridiculous, if we could have Hopes of Success, we must foresee, that those Hopes will be blasted in the Bud, by most of the Princes of *Germany* joining with *France*, *Spain*, and the *Emperor*, against us. Most of them have of late conceived such a Jealousy of the Power of the House of *Austria*, that they will rather join with *France* than see the Power of that House increased; and such of them as have lately taken Advantage of the Queen of *Hungary's* Distress, to get hold of some Part of her Dominions, must suppose, that their Possession will be at an End as soon as she acquires Power to take back what she has been obliged to yield, consequently they will be jealous of her Success, especially against the *French*, upon whom alone they can firmly depend for the Tenure of their late Acquisitions.

From these Considerations, Sir, it is evident, that in order to determine whether we are to give the Queen of *Hungary* any Assistance, we ought to distinguish between two Cases that are in themselves very different. To enable her to preserve her own Dominions, especially her *Italian* Dominions against *Spain*, I think, we ought to give her such Assistance as is consistent with our present Circumstances; but to enable her to make Conquests, either in *France* or *Italy*, I hope we have promised her no Assistance, I think we ought not to give her any. And from hence it is evident, that we ought not to think of assisting her with

Troops; because she can have no Occasion for our Assistance in that Case, in which alone we ought to give it, unless she is attacked in *Flanders*, *Germany*, or *Italy*. In *Flanders* she has never yet been, nor will be in Danger of being attacked, if our preposterous Politicks do not provoke an Attack upon that Quarter; and we are not, I hope, to send our Troops to her Assistance either in *Italy* or the furthestmost Parts of *Germany*.

This, Sir, makes our present Case different from any former. When Queen *Elizabeth* sent her Troops abroad, they were to be employed either in the *Netherlands*, or in the hithermost Parts of *France*, where she could easily recruit and support them, and as easily call them back when she had Occasion for them; but, if we send our Troops to *Italy*, or the farther End of *Germany*, we can neither recruit nor support them, nor can we easily call them back when we have a Mind; and the bad Success we met with in *Spain* during the last War, ought to be a Caveat against our ever again sending our Troops to fight foreign Quarrels at such a Distance from home.

Having mentioned Queen *Elizabeth*, Sir, I cannot pass over her Story, without observing how cautious she was of involving her People in a heavy Expence, for the Sake of guarding against remote Dangers. As *Spain* was then the Nation most formidable to *Europe*, and at the same Time her greatest Enemy, it is certain that she would have been in very great Danger, had that Nation been able to reduce the whole 17 Provinces of the *Netherlands* to Obedience. That Queen saw the Danger she was in, but as it was a remote Danger, she did not think her People were obliged to fight for preventing it, as if it had been *pro Aris & Focis*; therefore she was



so far from desiring her People to give the *Dutch* all the Assistance they were able, that she sent over but 5 or 6000 Men to their Assistance; and upon this Condition, that they should repay her all the Expence she put herself to, for their Defence, and should put some of the best Fortresses and Sea-Ports of their Country into her Hands, for securing the Repayment. In the same Manner it would certainly have been of the most dangerous Consequence to her, if the *Guise* or *Spanish* Faction had prevailed in *France*; and yet so cautious was she of putting her People to Expence, that she never sent above 7 or 8000 Men to the Assistance of *Henry* the IVth, and that at different Times, and but for a few Months: Nay, at last she refused to send him any of her Troops, unless he would undertake to pay or subsist them.

Suppose the Queen of *Hungary*, had been, or should still be obliged to submit to the Terms prescribed by *France*, I believe, it will not be said, that this Nation would now be in greater or more immediate Danger than it would have been in at that Time, had either the *Netherlands* or *France* been obliged to submit to *Spain*; why then should we now be in a greater Fright than we were in Queen *Elizabeth*'s Time? Or why should we now put ourselves to a much greater Expence for guarding against a Danger, that is at least as remote as the Danger was in her Time? The Reason is, we have of late got into a ridiculous Custom, of making ourselves the *Don Quixots* of *Europe*; and sometimes under the Pretence of preserving a Balance of Power in *Europe*, at other Times under the Pretence of preserving a Balance of Power in the North, we have engaged *totis viribus* in the Quarrel of almost every State in *Europe*, that has, by its Imprudence or Ambition, brought itself into any

Distress. The Consequence is, that whilst we take upon ourselves the Burden of defending our Allies, they give themselves very little Trouble about defending themselves. The present Queen of *Hungary* has shewn, what the last two *Emperors* might have done during the Grand Confederacy, if they had begun the War by giving Satisfaction to their *Hungarian* Subjects; but as they found us willing to fight their Battles for them, against the common Enemy, they took that Opportunity to harass and oppress our Brother Protestants in every Part of their Dominions, which was one of the Reasons of that War's lasting so long, and, consequently, of this Nation's being so much encumbered with Debt, and so heavily loaded with Taxes. Therefore, I wish, we would return to the wise Maxims of Queen *Elizabeth*, and resolve never to do so much for any of our Allies, as to make them neglect doing for themselves.

Suppose, Sir, we were absolutely certain, that *France* and *Spain* will unite in a War against us, as soon as they have brought the Queen of *Hungary* to their Terms; are we, for the Sake of putting off this distant Danger, to support a Land War, which will cost us more, and be much more ruinous to the Nation, than if we were, by ourselves alone, to support a Naval War against both these Nations? If we could have reasonable Hopes that our Land War would be successful, we ought not to engage in any such Scheme: How much less then ought we to engage in it, when we are almost certain, that our Ally upon the Continent will at last be overpowered, notwithstanding the utmost we can do to assist her. The Maxim, therefore, of our keeping *France* and *Spain* involved in a Land War, in order to prevent their attacking us with their joint Force by Sea, ought not to be received without some Qualification.

If

If we could procure such a Confederacy among the Princes upon the Continent, as might support a Land War against these two Nations, with a very little of our Assistance, it would then be right for us to think of it, because we should then be able to support our War against them by Sea with Ease and Advantage, or the Land War might, by a happy Issue, put it out of their Power to think of attacking us by Sea; but if the Land War must be chiefly supported at our Expence, we ought rather to take our Chance of supporting a Naval War by ourselves alone, than engage in any such War by Land, because it would divert us from prosecuting the War by Sea, which will always be most convenient for us, and by which alone we can expect to reap any Benefit to ourselves; and because by exhausting ourselves in the Prosecution of an unsuccessful War by Land, we may bring a Naval War upon ourselves, when we have no Strength left to support it.

It is easy, Sir, to apply this to our present Case: The War carried on by the Queen of *Hungary* by Land against *France* and *Spain*, must be carried on almost entirely at our Expence. The Expence will be such that it is impossible for this Nation, in its present Circumstances, to support it for many Years; and it is impossible we can thereby expect to obtain any Equivalent for the Queen of *Hungary*, or any Concessions, either from *France* or *Spain*, for ourselves; because, if our Land Armies should prove victorious, other Princes, who are now jealous of the Power of the House of *Austria*, and whose chief Security for what they have lately got Possession of depends upon the Power and Friendship of *France*, will interpose, and prevent our reaping the Fruits of our Victories: Nay, by their Interposition the Queen of *Hungary* may

be brought into as great Distress as ever, and must, very probably, at last be forced to make the best separate Peace she can for herself; so that, after we are quite exhausted by an expensive Land War, we shall be left to carry on, by ourselves alone, a Naval War against the united Force of *France* and *Spain*, when we have no Strength left to defend ourselves, either by Sea or Land. Our present Measures, therefore, may very justly be compared to an ignorant Quack, who by strong and excessive Evacuations keeps off the Crisis of a Fever, till the Patient has no Strength left to go through with it, which is generally attended with certain Death; whereas, if the Distemper had been left to its own Course, Nature might have brought on a speedy Crisis, the Patient would have had Strength enough to support it, and might have been quite easy, and fully recovered, before the Time he had done taking the expensive, and wasting preventive Remedies prescribed by the Doctor.

As to what has been pretended, Sir, that our Soldiers, when disbanded, will chearfully return to their former Employments, it is so contrary to Experience, in all Nations, and at all Times, that I need give it no Answer. It may, indeed, be in some Measure true, if we immediately call home and disband our Troops; because the new Levies have not yet had Time to get a Habit of Idleness, or to forget the Business they were bred to; but if they continue but a few Years abroad, none, or very few of them, either will, or can return to their former Employments, not only because of the Habit of Idleness they will have acquired, and their having forgot the Business they were bred to, but because their Places will be supplied by new Hands, who will be preferred by the Masters in every Sort of Business. This is so true, Sir, that



that let Peace come when it will, I am persuaded, the Danger of disbanding a great Number of our Soldiers, and thereby reducing them to a starving and desperate Condition, will be made use of as an Argument for our keeping up a much greater Army in Time of Peace, than we have ever yet been prevailed on to do; and this may, perhaps, be one of the By-views which our Ministers have, in pretending to assist the Queen of Hungary with Troops. In short, the View they openly pretend to have, which is that of assisting the Queen of Hungary, with our Troops as well as our Money and Navy, is in itself so chimerical, and may be attended with such fatal Consequences, that, I am persuaded, they have no such Thing really in View; consequently, they must have some secret Designs, which they dare not avow; and as all such ministerial Designs are inconsistent with the true Interest of the Nation, and of dangerous Consequence to our Constitution, I shall always be extremely cautious of being made the Dupe of their plausible Pretences, which, I am convinced, would be the Case, if by their pretended Zeal for the Service of the Queen of Hungary, I should allow myself to be drawn in to give my Consent to the present Motion.

*The last Speech I shall give in this Debate, is that which was made by T. Sempronius Gracchus, in the Character of the Lord Percival, and was in Substance thus.*

Mr. President,

S I R,

IF it were possible, after what I have read of former Transactions in this Country, and after what I have seen since I have had the Honour to sit here, to be surpris'd at any Thing that could happen in this House, the Opposition given to this Motion would have fill'd me with

Amazement: But it has ever been the epidemical Disease of a great Party in this Nation, in all similar Conjectures, to hang upon the Skirts of Government, and directly or indirectly to oppose every Measure of Vigour against France. This House has never wanted, I should say France has never wanted, even in this House, a Number of Men, who have zealously declaim'd to the manifest Advantage of her Views, upon Pretences of our Inability, of the Impracticability of a War with France, and upon the Security of our Situation as an Island; who first deceiv'd themselves, have done their utmost to delude others, and who by the fatal Success of such declamatory Speeches, have either prevented our early Resistance of the Measures of that Power, or have compell'd us to carry on that Resistance with great Difficulties at home, and insufficient Means abroad, or have acquired Influence enough in this Government, to force a precipitate Conclusion to that Resistance. It is by this Conduct, and by this alone, that we have insensibly been brought into that deplorable Condition in which we lately stood, and into those dangerous, expensive, and precarious Circumstances, in which it is but too true, that we still continue to stand. It is by this, and by this alone, that France has been enabled to rise to that prodigious Point of Power, which now threatens all Europe with universal Bondage.

This Power ought above all to be terrible to this Nation; our Situation as an Island will never balance our Situation in such a Neighbourhood. It is not only the Power by which this Nation can be alone destroy'd, but by which it most certainly will be destroy'd, whenever those our Allies upon the Continent, who alone are able, by their Land-Armies to threaten her with any real Danger, shall be broken and divided

divided — Whenever they shall be so awed, or so reduced, as to be unable to give her any Interruption in the Pursuit of her pernicious Designs upon *Great Britain*. Such Designs undoubtedly she long has entertained against us, and with greater Rancour than against any other People of the Earth. — She hates the House of *Austria*, and she fears it; she means to distress, to break, and to dismember the House of *Austria*; but she can never intend the utter Destruction of the House of *Austria*: So vast a Spoil can be never wrested totally from that House, without raising up some other Power dangerous to *France*. — But as to this Country, her old Antipathy on Account of former Wars, her Bigottry in Religion, the Envy at our extensive Trade, our Opulence, our Power, our Influence in *Europe*, the Obstruction we have often given to her Views, and the Benefits she may justly expect from a Change in this Government, are Motives that must urge her to pursue the entire Ruin of *Great Britain*. Her Passions and her Prejudices can be never gratified; her Dominions, and her Interests never be secured, by any other Means than the Subversion of our happy Constitution, the Division of our Territories, the total Prohibition of our Commerce, the Establishment of a tributary Prince who must depend upon her Authority, and of a Religion which can be supported only by her Power.

It is little better than Infatuation to be insensible of this formidable Truth. And it is now no Time to suffer ourselves to be amused by these deceitful and destructive Doctrines I have mentioned, which have brought us into our present Difficulties, and which many now unhappily labour to revive among us. It is the Duty of every honest Man to set his Face against them. The

Poison has here already unaccountably diffused among the People, and if not powerfully check'd by the Sense and Resolution of this House, this House itself, before we can suspect it, may be compell'd by the Factions of a deluded and inflamed Multitude, to give this Nation into the Hands of *France*. For to abandon our Allies in their present Necessity, to desist from the Measures of the War in which we are now engaged, would be in effect to do this. — And yet to this Point is directed all the Clamour of the Discontented, every Libel of the Disaffected, and the whole Endeavour of the present Opposition.

It becomes me in Prudence, and it is most agreeable to my Inclinations to treat those Gentlemen with whom I formerly concurred, and with whom I totally differ in these Points, with all possible Regard; but I must own, that I have received the greatest Alarm to observe the Sentiments now espoused by some of those, whose Principles I ever thought would have preserved them against these Notions. I may speak freely upon this Occasion, I have nothing to fear from any false Reflection or Aspersions, that I have acted an inconsistent Part. — Let those alone, be stung with these Reflections, who not two Years since concurred with me to pull down the late Minister for his pacific Conduct, and are now become the Advocates of the same pacific Measures: Measures, which they not only condemn'd so furiously before, but which were infinitely more excusable at that Time, than they could be now, because the State of our Affairs was then in a Manner desperate.

At the Time this Parliament first met, the manifest Danger of the common Liberties of *Europe*, struck this Nation with so much Horror, that the Voice of every Man, both within Doors and without, cried



cried loudly and irresistibly for these Measures of War.—The Destruction of the House of *Austria* was consider'd as the Ruin of the Balance of Power; the Loss of that Balance was then justly look'd upon as the utter and inevitable, if not the immediate Subversion of the Laws, Religion, and Independency of this Kingdom. We had then no Armies formed, the greater Part of *Germany* awed by the Arms, or corrupted by the Gold of *France*.—The greatest Powers of *Germany* confederated with *France* against *Germany* itself.—The Dominions of the Queen of *Hungary*, already in Possession of the Enemy, almost as far as to the very Walls of *Vienna*.—The natural Allies of the House of *Austria*, scarce any one of them in a Condition to afford her any Assistance. *Russia*, by the treacherous Intrigues of *France*, shaken in its very Government at home, and embarrass'd at the same Time with the *Swedish* War abroad. The *Dutch* and the Elector of *Hanover* separated from each other, and equally restrain'd by a great *French* Army in *Westphalia*. And the King of *Sardinia* surrounded by a very superior Force, dubious at least as to his Ability, if not as to his Intention, to assist us. This was the deplorable State of our Affairs when this Parliament first sat down.—Yet even in this Extremity the whole Nation called upon us to exert our utmost Efforts for the Preservation of the House of *Austria*.—This House resolved, unanimously, to send 16,000 of our national Troops abroad, and voted great Subsidies in Money to the King of *Sardinia*, and Queen of *Hungary*. It was then the Opinion of all Mankind, that no Expence, no Danger ought to deter us from engaging in these Measures. This Opinion was justly founded upon this Reasoning; that Ruin being certain, if we remain inactive, however improbable

it might be to prevent that Ruin, even with our utmost Efforts, that it ought to be attempted: That in such Extremity of Danger, Caution was Imprudence, and that nothing but Folly could induce any Man to plead for the Preservation of Troops, which, after such an Event as the Ruin of the Balance of Power, could not defend us; or for the Saving of Treasures, which might, indeed, tempt our Enemies the sooner to invade us, but were utterly insufficient to withstand the whole Power of *France* and *Spain* united, and turned against us alone.

If such were the Circumstances of this Nation, such the Sense of the whole People, and such the Opinion, Advice, and Resolution of every individual Member of this Assembly, where is the Man in this House entitled to condemn the same Measures now, with that Air of Authority, which the Gentlemen on the other Side the House assume of late in every Debate? Do they flatter themselves that it can be so soon forgotten, by whom this Country was brought into these Measures, and if they ought to be condemned, who are to be justly answerable for them? If these Gentlemen would give themselves Time only for the least Reflexion upon their own Conduct, I am persuaded they would be more moderate in their Censures upon other Men. They would think themselves sufficiently happy in being permitted to change their own Opinions without incurring any Reflexion for it, and forbear to insult others for acting in one uniform and consistent Way, upon the very Plan which they themselves prescribed no longer than two Years since.

For my own Particular, I never differ'd from myself with regard to this great Point, not only from the Hour I first enter'd into this House, but from the Time that I turned my Thoughts at all to the publick Business.

finess. With regard to the Interest of this Country, in preventing the least Acquisition of Power to *France*, I ever did, and I ever shall think, that the very Being of this Nation depends upon it. And for what relates to the present Question, I am utterly unable to reconcile to common Sense or Reason, nor can I find out, to what Cause I can attribute this sudden Change in the Sentiments of many of my Friends. Is our Danger equal? Our Resolution to withstand it ought to be the same. —Is our Danger less? Surely this must be a great Encouragement to pursue those Measures which have made it less. —Is our Danger now none at all? I own, that it is doing too much Honour to the Administration to insinuate this to be the Case. — And therefore, in what Light soever I consider this Proposition, it seems to me no better than Madness to recall those Troops in this Conjunction, which you all clamour'd to have sent abroad in the former Condition of our Affairs.

Where was the Man of the most sanguine Hopes, who could have thought two Years ago, who could have flatter'd himself even at our last Meeting here, that before we met again, the House of *Austria* should have recover'd her whole Dominions, possess'd herself of the Territories and Electorate of *Bavaria*, ruin'd a great Army of the *French*, and repell'd all the Forces of that Nation to the Banks of the *Rhine*; that she should have even carried the War into the Bowels of *France* itself, as by her irregular Troops she did? Is it to avail us nothing to have forced the *French* by a Series of Defeats to have traversed half *Europe*, not in the Way of a Retreat, but of a total Rout? to have brought a Superiority of Power to the very Frontier of *France*? —to have added Experience and great Glory to the *British* Arms, to

have dissolved the Confederacies, ruin'd totally one of the Allies, and baffled in every Part and Point the Power and Designs of *France*?

Yet, after all this, one Hon. Gentleman has thought fit to assert, that we have done nothing; and why? *because the Austrian Armies did not pass the Rhine.* Good God! is all that I have recapitulated here to be accounted nothing? Where have we heard or read of so vast a Turn in the Story of any Time? Another Hon. Gentleman owns, that, indeed, a little has been done, *but then it has been done by the Austrians, and not by us.* But let me ask, whether the House of *Austria* could have done what she has done without us? Could she have maintained her vast Armies without our Supplies? If the 60,000 *French* we detained so long upon the *Maine*, and beat at *Dettin-gen*, had been added to the Armies of the Enemy in *Bohemia* and *Bavaria*, was it probable that the Queen of *Hungary* could have gain'd a Superiority, or even stood her Ground in the Heart of *Germany*? Could the King of *Sardinia* have attempted to resist the united Powers of *France*, *Spain*, and *Naples*, without our Fleets, without our Money, without this Diversion occasion'd by our Arms? Had our Troops been disbanded and recalled in Pursuance of Motions of the same Nature with this now made you, which were likewise made in the last Session of Parliament, where is the Man can doubt, but that by this Time, those Colours had been planted on the Ramparts of *Vienna*, which many now in this House have lately seen protected, with Difficulty, under the Cannon of *Landau*?

When Gentlemen can thus turn short upon themselves, and quarrel with their own Councils, and their own System: When they can work themselves up to such a Point as to deny these visible Advantages, and  
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repine at the most providential Success: Nothing that they may object farther to any Branch of publick Conduct can create the least Surprise. I shall therefore express no Wonder at the other Assertions of the Hon. Gentleman, strange as it must otherwise appear to me, and every Man of common Understanding, that such Sort of Reasoning should hope for any Countenance in this Assembly.

Among other Matter of Reflection upon the Administration, the same Gentleman upbraids them with a Neglect of the Spanish War, to carry on a War in which we are not at all concerned. This short Sentence contains at once two Assertions, fraught with Delusion, but a Delusion so very gross, that it can never weigh with a Majority of this House.

As to our Pursuit of a War in which we are not at all concerned; by this, I suppose, is meant the War in which we are engaged in Support of the House of Austria. But to this I shall say very little; for if there is a Man who can seriously believe, that we are not concerned to prevent the universal Influence, or universal Empire of France over all Europe; or who does not see, that neither the Trade, nor Liberty of this Country could subsist an Hour after that Event; or who is weak or ignorant enough not to know, that a very small Addition of Strength to France, either by an immediate Accession of Power to herself, or Diminution of Power in those States who form the Balance against her, must inevitably give her that universal Influence, or universal Empire; such a Man is not to be argued with; no Reason can operate upon a Mind incapable of assenting to a Proposition, of all others in Nature the most glaring and self-evident.

But as to the Neglect of the Spanish War, Men may be more liable to be imposed upon by this Suggestion, because they are taught, and

it is easy to confound the present with the past. I am myself as ready to allow as any Gentleman in this House, that in the Beginning of that War, and whatever Reasons there might be for it, none have yet occurred satisfactory to me, the Slowness and Weakness of our Preparations bore the Face of manifest criminal Neglect. But at this Time the Case is extremely different; for however we might have wounded Spain in the *West-Indies*, in the Beginning of the War, Experience must, or should have taught us, that Spain is now become invulnerable in those Parts, that our Attempts against her in that Climate are ruinous to our Troops, and to our Fleets, and more destructive to ourselves than to the Enemy. Whereas, on the other hand, by the Measures we have pursued lately with regard to that Power, and by taking prudent Hold of those Opportunities which the Rashness and Ambition of the Queen of Spain has afforded us in Europe, it must be visible to every Man who is not wilfully blind, that we have put her to incredible Expence; that we have distress'd and weakened her by a prodigious Loss of Troops, by cutting off, in a great Degree, the Means either of recruiting or withdrawing her *Italian Armies*, by the Ruin of her Credit in Europe, and by an almost total Interruption of her Returns of Treasure from *America*. This can admit of no Dispute, and I may defy the wisest Man on Earth to point out any Method, by which we can gall or injure that Power by any other effectual Means, or at least by any Means less injurious and expensive to ourselves, or more conducive to the Support of that general System, which we are bound in Duty to our Allies and to ourselves, by Treaties, and by Self-Interest and Self-Preservation, to maintain.

The Hon. Gentleman asserted in  
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the next Place, *that it is unprofitable, and impracticable, any longer to carry on the War in Favour of the Queen of Hungary.*

He says it must be *unprofitable*, because we have already done all that we can hope to do. The *Austrians* have recovered their Dominions, the *French* are expell'd, or at least are retired out of the Empire: What more can you desire or expect?

Sir, however plausible this Reasoning may be, it contains a notorious Fallacy, and this Fallacy appears at once, by attending to this one Observation, that the Gentlemen on the other Side, when they talk in this Strain, speak only of the *Means*, when they should consider the *End*. In the same Manner I observe, when it suits the Purpose of their Argument, they speak of the *End*, when the *Means* only are in Question.—But in this Case, the speaking of the *Means*, and considering the Circumstances, and Nature of this War, and the Time we have been engaged in it, we have done much more than could have been expected; yet speaking of the *End*, and it is that which ought to guide our Councils in this Debate, we cannot justly say that we have done any Thing; for in Matters of War, nothing is done till the *End* is compass'd, that is, till Peace is made, or at least is in our Power to make, upon solid, safe, and honourable Terms. Were we to destroy all the regular Troops of *France*, were we possessed of Half her Provinces, and every strong Town in her Dominions; were our Armies now triumphant in her Capital itself; still if we were to withdraw and to disband our Forces, to give her Leisure to raise new Armies, to repossess herself of her Provinces, of her strong Towns, and of her Capital, what Man is so stupid as not to see, that in all Propriety we might be

said to have done nothing? This will be the very Case, if we now recal our Troops. What shall hinder *France* from raising new Armies, from forming new Alliances, from re-entering *Germany* once more in the same hostile Manner, and from attaining every Point of her destructive and ambitious Views? Unless, therefore, this Gentleman can shew, that such a Peace as I have mentioned (and I will add, a Peace, in which our Differences with *Spain* likewise are properly adjusted,) is now in the Power of our Ministers to make; nay more, that such a Peace is actually made; with Submission, I humbly apprehend, that all he has said upon this Head, is very little to the Purpose.

I shall now speak to the pretended *Impracticability of the War*. That it must be very burdensome, there is no Doubt, for if the greatest State in *Europe*, animated by the Prospect of universal Dominion, enabled by the absolute Power of its Government to draw every Shilling out of private Pockets into the publick Purse, and assisted by the personal Service of all its People, thro' the national Vanity, and martial Habit of the Country; if such a State will press the Ruin of its Neighbours, with an obstinate Expence of all its Blood, and all its Treasure, no Man can be so weak to think it an easy Task to reduce, or even to resist a Power which shall act this Part. But consider not so much the Difficulties you must now encounter to defend yourselves in this Conjunction, as the certain Impossibility of your being ever able to do it again in any other, if you lose the present Opportunity.

The supposed *Impracticability* of the War is founded upon these Reasons; that we are a ruin'd and exhausted People, that we have no Allies, and that the *Dutch* do not assist us. I shall take the Liberty to say



say a Word or two to every one of these Propositions.

First then, *that we are a ruin'd and exhausted People*, is so far from being true, that it is amazing any Man can seriously assert it in Defence of the Testimony of all our Senses: When at this very Hour we raise immense Sums, with great Facility at little more than 3 *per Cent.* when, notwithstanding the fashionable Cant of the Times, it is indisputably true, that our Commerce flourishes in the highest Degree, and B in particular the Woollen Manufacture, the Staple of this Island. That this is the Case of that Branch of Trade, is manifest from the Papers relating to it, now in the Custody of your Clerk, which I took the Liberty myself to call for not long C since; for it appears from thence, that in that Article alone we have exported annually, for the last three Years, one fourth Part, or a Million more at least in Value, than in any former Period.—And as to the general Trade of this Country, the Accounts of the Sinking Fund, now lying on your Table, afford a most unerring Rule by which you may judge of that; for this Fund arises from the Surplusses of all your Duties, and, in its last Year's Produce, has amounted to one Hundred and E twenty thousand Pounds more almost, than it ever did in any Time of profound Peace.

As to the next Particular, *that we are now in War without Allies*: When Gentlemen assert this, they must certainly imagine that they talk to F Children, or at least to Men who have lost all their Understanding. Is the House of *Austria* no Ally to us, because she is the Principal in this Quarrel? Did ever any Man pretend to say that the Emperor was no Ally to *England* in the last War? This is G a Quibble about Words, which cannot possibly bear Debate. Is not the King of *Sardinia* our Ally, are not

the *Dutch* our Allies, tho' not yet entered in the same Proportion of Expence? Sir, I will venture to go farther upon this Head than I have hitherto heard any Man do upon it: I will undertake to prove, that the Confederacy in which we are engaged against *France*, as it stands at this Time, is even stronger than that in the late War. This is not to be denied, if it appears, that we have any Thing near the same Number of Troops that we then had; since, if the Alliance be now confined to fewer Powers, and those fewer Powers have nearly the same Forces, it is a certain Argument of superior Strength; for the Weakness of all Confederacies lies in the Number of the contracting Parties. The utmost Degree of Strength is in a Power lodged in one Nation, the next to that in a Force combined of two only, and the farther you remove from the Point of Unity in all Engagements of this Sort, your Ability is diminished marvellously by it. D The Reason is evident from the Experience of all, and particularly of the last War, and it proceeds from the Variety of the Views and Interests, from the Jealousies and Differences, which constantly arise at all Times, more or less, in combined E Armies, and confederated Nations.—Now, Sir, give me Leave to observe, that the Troops of the Powers engaged on our Side, amount at this Hour to 350,000; the *Austrians* are 230,000; the King of *Sardinia*, exclusive of his Militia, maintains near 50,000; *Great Britain* has at least the same Number in actual Service against the Enemy, besides what she maintains for the immediate Defence of her own Dominions; and the *Dutch* have this Year furnished 20,000. I desire Gentlemen, after this, to reflect, whether, notwithstanding all the nominal Allies we then had, the Troops of the Confederates in the last War ever amounted in

in Fact to more than these, and whether all the Troops of *France* and *Spain*, that can possibly be employed against us, exceed this Number.

This leads me, Sir, to the next Objection, that it is impracticable to carry on the War without a farther Assistance from the Dutch. But I must take Notice of one Thing before I enter into this very popular, tho' very superficial Argument. If Gentlemen do in earnest think it absolutely necessary, and if they do in earnest wish that the *Dutch* should join us with all their Power, can any Man imagine, that the Conduct of those Gentlemen who make you these Motions, and who harangue from Day to Day against our Support of the House of *Austria*, is the likely Means to induce them to it? One great Cause of this cold and cautious Management of the States, is obvious to the whole World. They cannot yet depend upon the Stability of the Measures of *Great Britain*. In the last War they, and all the rest of the Allies were abandoned wickedly by this Country. This is what they never can forget, and strange it would be if they should forget it at this Time, when they see so great a Number in this House, at this Day, treading in the very same Steps, and acting the very Part of those, who caused that unhappy and dishonourable Issue to the late War. These Gentlemen, therefore, have at least no Right to clamour at the *Dutch* for their Conduct, till they change their own; nor are they justified to oppose the present Measures of this Government, on Pretence of a Defect in Power, of which they are so much the Cause themselves.

But now, Sir, as to the Point itself.—Perhaps what I am going to insinuate, to some may appear a Kind of Paradox, in which, however, I am satisfied, that there is at least so much Reason, as certainly to deserve a little Attention; I say, perhaps it may be Matter of Doubt,

whether it may be so much our Interest as some Gentlemen imagine, that the *Dutch* should engage much farther than they have done. I think, by what I have already observed, that unless some new Event should happen, our Alliance is at least equal to that which we contend against. If so, let us consider seriously, what great Advantage would accrue to us from what we desire of the *Dutch*. This, I think, might possibly be found the Consequence: It might make the War more general, and, consequently, render it more difficult to bring it to a Period. It might bring the War where we might least wish to see it, and yet put *France* under no new Difficulty. The contrary Sentiment prevails so strongly as it does, chiefly from a Want of due Regard to the Service which the *Dutch* now do us. Sir, they now assist the Queen of *Hungary* with Money, and with 20,000 of their Troops. Their Armies, since this War, have been from Time to Time augmented by above 30,000 Men. They have refused a Neutrality with *France*, and they have already, in the strongest Terms, acknowledged this War to be a *Causa Fœderis*. *France* must therefore look upon the *Dutch*, whether they declare more openly or not, to be, in Fact, as much engaged against her, as if they marched their whole Army to invade her Country. The *Dutch* are now at the very same Expence, or near it, as if they did; and by the Situation of their Troops, may, at any Time, in less than three Weeks, advance upon the Frontier of *France*. *France* is therefore very near as much embarrassed and distressed by this Conduct, as if they declared actual War. For not knowing how soon they may, she is obliged to repair, supply, and garison her Towns in *Flanders*, at a vast Expence, and to maintain an equal Body of Troops on that Side, in the same State of Inactivity with those of *Holland*, while



while we are enabled, by this Means, to act offensively in any other Part, with the same Proportion of Power, as we could do in the other Case. I would not be understood to urge this Argument so far, as to be thought to mean, that the *Dutch* could not afford us still a greater Assistance than they do; but, I mean to infer thus much from it, and, I am sure, I am right in it, that the Advantage of that Assistance could by no Means work so great a Difference, as these Gentlemen suggest. This, I am satisfied, will certainly appear, if ever the *Dutch* should advance considerably farther in this Quarrel; and this you may depend upon, that for the very first Event, it will bring the War inevitably into *Flanders*, and to our own Door, where I much doubt whether it may be our Interest that the War should come.

Upon the Whole, in my humble Opinion, such is the true State of our Affairs, that it is equally absurd to say, that we are now in no Danger from the Power of *France*, or that the Power of *France* is so great, that we have no Means possible to resist it. Both these Sentiments, absolutely contradictory, and diametrically opposite as they plainly appear to be, are used alternately and indifferently by the Gentlemen on the other Side, in Support of the dangerous Proposition of this Day to recal and to disband our Forces. I have no Pleasure in reflecting upon Inconsistencies, and they have been too obvious in this, and many other of our Debates of late upon this Subject. I shall only, therefore, say, as to the State of our Affairs, that the Fact is this, that, such is the Power, such the Ambition, such the destructive Plan laid down by *France* to divide and enslave the World; a Plan pursued with the utmost Obstinacy thro' every Difficulty for above a Century last past; that, without the strongest Efforts of *Great Britain*, we and all our Allies must be undone;

but that we have still Reason to hope that the Power of *Great Britain*, added to that of her Allies, before they are destroyed, may defeat these mighty Projects, and with the Blessing of God upon our Arms, convert that Ruin she has designed for others, in some Degree, upon her own Head. The Attempt undoubtedly is great, hazardous, and difficult; but it is glorious, it is just, it is all, I think, that in our present Circumstances we have left to do; and I must frankly speak my Sentiments, (tho', perhaps, very many on both Sides the House, struck with the Danger and the Difficulty of the Undertaking, differ from me, because they know not how to face so bold, and sad a Truth,) that to lay down our Arms, before we have done even more than to obtain a Peace, by putting the Affairs of *Europe* once again upon the same Footing on which they stood, when *France* first made this perfidious Attack upon the House of *Austria*, will be but to protract our Fate, to give *France* Time to recover her Losses, and enable her to seize some other Conjuncture, when it may be utterly impossible to make head against her. I consider this as our only Opportunity, and if we slight that Providence which has so critically, and so remarkably assisted us to make this Stand; I do firmly believe, it is the last that will be ever offered to us again. I could suggest very many Reasons, from the Circumstances and the Interests of the different Powers of *Europe*, in Support of this Opinion. But this would carry me too far.

I shall only add one Word more. I think those Gentlemen, who almost at any Time, in this Country, oppose the Administration in the Prosecution of a War, act with greater Zeal than Judgment. For tho' I am no Minister, (and I have seen enough of the sickle Humour of

of this Nation, never to desire to be one;) yet common Sense has taught me so much of the Sentiments all Ministers must entertain in such a State as this, as to be thoroughly convinced, and it is confirmed by the Experience of all our History, that they meet, and must meet with so many Difficulties in the Prosecution of vigorous Measures, that your Danger is entirely on the other Hand: Not that they will follow any War too long, but that they will close too eagerly with any Offer of Peace. That I therefore may not be instrumental either in compelling the Administration to take this Step, or in urging them by any Distress to fall into that Weakness, which they are naturally exposed to, by their Stations; and farther, that I may, as far as in me lies, deprive them of all Excuse for yielding to that Infirmary; for these Reasons, and I am conscious of no other Motives, I have concurred, and shall concur with them, not only in this, but in every other Vote and Measure, that may tend to the vigorous Prosecution of this just and necessary War.

[This JOURNAL to be continued in our next.]

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TRIAL in relation to JAMES ANNESLEY, Esq; and the Earl of ANGLESEY. Continued from p. 393. The Lord Chief Baron went on thus in his Charge:

GENTLEMEN of the Jury, I shall now proceed to observe on the Evidence in behalf of the Defendant. The Nature of his Defence was, that a Number of Persons who resided in the Country, near where the Lessor of the Plaintiff was said to be born, and who lived there during the whole Time of Lord and Lady Altham's being at Dunmain, prove, that they never

heard of, or saw a Child of Lord and Lady Altham; and that it was the Reputation of the Country, that Lord and Lady Altham never had a Child.

Col. Loftus was the first Witness A produc'd on the Part of the Defendant: He says, that he lived upwards of 30 Years at Loftus Hall, which is within 8 Miles of Dunmain, and that he knew Lord and Lady Altham when he lived there; and he says, he never heard they had a Child. This Witness is a Gentleman of great Honour and Distinction, and his Testimony is unquestionable. — But, Gentlemen, as Col. Loftus says he never visited Lady Altham, you will consider, whether it is likely she could have a Child without his being acquainted therewith. C

Col. Palliser is the next Witness: He says, he never heard that Lady Altham had a Child, and is satisfied in his Conscience that she never had a Child; and that he never heard she miscarried. He farther says, that if she had had a Child, he believes he should have heard it, and that he saw her on Sundays at Church. D

You have it in your Notes, Gentlemen, what, Mr. Elmes, Mr. Lambert, and Mrs. Giffard say to the same Purpose.—If the Defendant's E Witnesses are to be believed herein, the Fact the Plaintiff contends for, must be said to be acted with such Privacy, that it did not come to the Knowledge of many in that Part of the Country.

The Defendant has likewise produced Mr. Napper, and Mr. Elmes, and they were both very conversant in the Family at Dunmain. Napper was employ'd by Lord Altham to make Minutes to the Tenants; he says, he never heard there was a Son, and that the Tenants did never object there was a Son. G

In the next Place, Gentlemen, the Defendant produced Heath, Rolph, Dwyer, Niese, and Owen Carvenagh, all



all Servants; who lived in the House at the Time of the controverted Pregnancy, and they all swore, that Lady *Altham* had not a Child at that Time, or at any other Time while they lived in the Service; and that they never heard that Lady *Altham* had a Child till of late, by means of the Dispute in Question; they all agree, that there was a Child of *Joan Landy's* born on the Lands of *Dunmain*, but positively deny that Lady *Altham* ever had a Child; and *Heath*, I must observe to you, B was Lady *Altham's* Woman before she came to *Ireland*, and lived with her to the Time of her Death, and expressly swears to her Non-pregnancy.

Gentlemen, the next Piece of Testimony which the Defendant has produc'd, is of my Lady's going to *Wexford* Assizes at the Time mention'd by the Witnesses; which if true, from the Circumstances of the Affair, must stand in the Place of positive Evidence. Mrs. *Giffard* tells you, that some Persons were tried there D for enlisting Men for the Service of the Pretender; she says, she went in a Coach with Lady *Altham*, and that Lord *Altham* rode, and that Mrs. *Heath* rode, and that Lady *Altham* lodged at one *Swinny's* in *Ross*; she says farther, that she remembers that Mr. *Cesar Colclough* sat near Lady *Altham* and the Witnesses, in the Court House.

*Rolph* and *Heath* likewise swear, that Lady *Altham* was at that Time at *Wexford* Assizes, and they agree with Mrs. *Giffard*, that she went F along with Lady *Altham* in a Coach, and that my Lord rode, and that Mrs. *Heath* and *Rolph* rode.

Mrs. *Heath* says, that my Lady and she went to *Dublin* the May after the Assizes, and mentions certain Circumstances to prove her being G there on the Birth-Day of K. *George I.* And *Rolph* says, that my Lord *Altham* went to *Dublin* in May 1715,

and mentions the Scuffle he had with the Gardener, and that Lord and Lady *Altham* were in *Dublin* before that Time.

Now, Gentlemen, if this Fact can be established, it puts an End entirely to the Fact in Favour of the Defendant, because the Time of the Birth is fixed for *April* or *May*; and if Lady *Altham* was at the Assizes which began (as Mr. *Kerr* tells you) the 16th of *April* 1715, and went to *Dublin* in *May* following, (I think it is about 3 Weeks after the Assizes, as the Witnesses mention) it would destroy all the Plaintiff's Proofs to that Point; because she must be then too far advanc'd in her Pregnancy, or it must be in a very short Time after her Delivery, in either of which C Circumstances a Lady in her Condition could not be supposed to go abroad. But how far this Evidence is supported, Gentlemen, you will consider.

I must take Notice to you, that Mr. *Colclough*, and Mr. *Kerr*, (a Witness examin'd for the Defendant) say, they don't remember to have seen any Ladies in the Court-House at *Wexford*; and Mr. *Colclough* said, he did not sit by any Lady there.

*Turner* and *Higgison* are produc'd by the Plaintiff in Contradiction to the Defendant's Witnesses, with respect to the Assizes of *Wexford*; and *Higgison* says, he went to *Wexford* Assizes, and that he paid my Lord *Altham* some Money there; and that he called at *Dunmain* before he went to the Assizes, and that my Lady came down Stairs, and gave him a Glass of Wine, and that she was big with Child, and that he drank to her safe Delivery; and he says, that my Lady was not at *Wexford* Assizes. Thus you see how the Witnesses on both Sides stand in Opposition to each other; some of them must be false, whoever it be, God only knows. One Circumstance I must observe to you, that Mrs.

442 *Cause between J. Annesley, Esq; and the E. of Anglesey.*

Mrs. *Heath* says, that there was a Sister of Mrs. *Giffard* went along with her and with Lady *Altham* to the Assizes, which was omitted by the rest.

There have been several Objections made to the Witnesses on both Sides not speaking circumstantially, and especially with respect to Time and Place: I shan't trouble you with the Repetition of them, your Notes will instruct you: But I look upon these Objections to be equal on both Sides. And as to the Objection of the mean low Condition of some of the Witnesses, you'll judge whether that should have Weight: Servants about the Family may be supposed likely enough to know Facts; they contradict each other in Terms on both Sides, about Lady *Altham's* being with Child; 'tis a single Fact that any Body may say, or not say, that she was pregnant.

You'll consider, Gentlemen, the Opposition between Mrs. *Cole* and Mrs. *Heath*; if Mrs. *Cole's* Account is to be believed, as to a Miscarriage, then Mrs. *Heath's* must be false. — There is no Imputation on Mrs. *Cole*, but on the Circumstance of Time of Lord and Lady *Altham's* going to *Vice's*, wherein Mrs. *Heath* differs from her; this has been so judiciously observed by Mr. Prime Sergeant, that you must have it in your Memory. — And you'll likewise consider, what the Defendant's Counsel observed with regard to the Account a young Girl can give of that Affair, and the Answer the Gentlemen on the other Side make to that, with respect to the Curiosity of Girls.

You'll take Notice, Gentlemen, that Mrs. *Heath's* Credibility is impeached by one *Hussey*; he seems to give his Testimony with a little too much Art; and how far his Testimony can avail to taking away the Credit of Mrs. *Heath*, you are to judge.

*Rolph* delivered his Testimony in

a very clear Manner, and there is one Circumstance that should gain him Credit, that *Scott* says he was Butler at *Dunmain* at the Time of the Birth of the Child, and the other Witnesses say, *Meagher* was the Butler; but on his Cross-Examination he was not so strict; he was asked, did he ever tell to any of the People that came over along with him a Ship-board, that the Pretender's Men were try'd at *Wexford* Assizes? He said, he could not tell whether he told any of them, tho' he said, there were near 40 Passengers in the same Ship, nor could he name any of them: And his Evidence concerning Mr. *M'Kercher's* Offer of a Lieutenancy seems somewhat strange: It is very extraordinary that Mr. *M'Kercher* should offer any such Thing to him in the Presence of Strangers, which the other never saw before. — I must observe farther to you, that *Rolph* and Mrs. *Giffard* differed about their Account of the Road from *Dunmain* House to Mrs. *Giffard's* House, as the Counsel for the Plaintiff have remarked to you fully; and tho' these are slight Circumstances, they deserve your Attention.

Likewise you'll take notice, that *Anthony Dwyer* differs from the rest of the Witnesses; he says, that he lived in the House of *Dunmain* for 3 Quarters of a Year after the Separation, and that there was no Child there; but *Rolph*, and *Niese*, and others of the Witnesses said, the Child came there after the Separation.

You'll likewise consider, how extremely strong the Testimonies of *Doyle* and *Murphy* are, and how they are contradicted by the Defendant's Witnesses; and take into your Thoughts the Observations the Defendant's Counsel made on the Variation they made in Point of Time in their Evidence; and how far the Testimony of Mrs. *Cole* and Mrs. *Heath* may be reconciled together,



in respect of throwing the Saucers, and with *McCormick* concerning the Midwife sent for.

I must take Notice to you, that Mr. *Lambert* and *Heath*, two of the Witnesses, disagree in their Testimony about *Sutton*: *Lambert* says, that my Lady's Chariot came for *Sutton* to *Ros*, and that he went therein, and attended my Lady for about a Fortnight. But *Heath* said, she knew no Disorder that occasioned *Sutton*'s Attendance for a Fortnight.

As to *Christopher Brown*, he was greatly mistaken about the Description of the House of *Durmain* from the other Witnesses. There is some Difference in recollecting Circumstances, and swearing to Circumstances without Recollection; if the Testimony given of those Circumstances happens to be false, it goes to the Credit of his whole Evidence.

You'll please likewise to observe on the Circumstance Col. *Hall* mentions, of seeing the Boy in *Ros* in 1727, and how Lord *Altham* owned to him, that he was his natural Son, on his speaking to him about him.

*Erben*'s Testimony for the Plaintiff, Gentlemen, is very strong; he tells you of his taking the Boy to his Father's House, and supporting him there for a while, and that he saw him afterwards at the House of *Francis Barret*, and of his being reputed the natural Son of Lord *Altham* by *Joan Landy*. *Erben* went a Step farther, and gave an Account of his observing his Face among others the first Time of his coming to *Ros* since his Return to this Kingdom. You have heard him, Gentlemen, declare, that he said he believed that the Lessor of the Plaintiff was that same Person, and that he particularly described his Nose—If *Joan Landy* had a Son at *Ros*, his Evidence must have Weight—You are likewise, Gentlemen, to consider how all the Witnesses for the Defendant swore him to be a Bastard, and what Credit is to be given to them.

Gentlemen, *William Elmes* says, that Lord *Altham* declared he would not for cool, that the Boy should know that *Joan Landy* was his Mother, and *Herd* says the same; yet *Niese* and some of the rest of the Witnesses said, he was called by the Name of *Jemmy Landy*, and that it was no Secret that *Joan Landy* was the Mother of the Boy: You'll consider, Gentlemen, how these Variations are to operate.

You will, Gentlemen, compare *McMullen*'s Testimony, a Witness for the Defendant, who said, that the Boy owned to her (at the late Lord *Altham*'s Funeral) that *Joan Landy* was his Mother; I say, you'll

compare this with the Testimony of Mr. *Bush* and Mr. *Tigh*, who say, that the Boy persisted in declaring that he was the legitimate Son of Lord *Altham*; and if you be inclined to believe them, you must then consider how far you'll give Credit to the Letter mentioned in the Testimony of *Heath* and *McMullen*.

A Where there is such Clashing of Witnesses, tho' they agree in some Circumstance, you will consider the Probability and Improbability; you will likewise consider, if you believe the Defendant spirited away the Boy, what Presumptions are to be infer'd from thence; but at the same Time take into your Considerations the Circumstances of the Family, and the Joy it must give them to have an Heir, and whether the late Lord *Anglesey* would not have been glad of it in his Life-time, and what Satisfaction it would give the Duke and Dutches of *Buckingham*, and how much it would be the Interest of Lady *Altham* to have the Guardianship of her Son during his Minority, from which she might receive some Support in her Necessity; and whether these Circumstances do not shew the Improbability of the Facts laid down by the Plaintiff.

C There are other Circumstances also, proper for your Consideration; it is not very probable, that a poor infamous Woman shou'd be appointed to be the Nurse to a Son of such Expectation. It might be a just Subject of an Application, or a Complaint from Lady *Altham* to her Father; she might have writ over to the Duke of *Buckingham*, I have a Son by Lord *Altham*, but he has put him under the Care of his Whore. Nothing is to reconcile this, but what *Joan Laffan* says, that Lady *Altham* did not know it till after the Separation. But you are to judge, if this Piece of Evidence was calculated for any particular Purpose. The Attendants, that the Plaintiff's Witnesses say Lady *Altham* had at the Birth of the Child, are very proper for your Consideration; a Lady in her Circumstances may well be presumed to be attended in another Manner.

F It is likewise requisite you should take into your Thoughts, how usual it is to have Sponsors of Rank and Dignity for Noblemen's Children.

The Defendant's Counsel have urged the Improbability of the Legitimacy from the Neglect of the Boy. You will consider, how far that is taken away by the Influence of Miss *Gregory*, and whether the Cruelty of a Man in abandoning a Bastard Child, may not imply the same Disposition in the Parent, to abandon a legitimate Child on a slight Provocation; for tho' a Child be illegitimate,

legitimate, he claims the Protection of a Father, and Noblemen do not look on their Bastards in the same Light as poor Persons do; and you will observe, Gentlemen, the Answer the Plaintiff's Counsel gave for the Neglect of the Child, with respect to Lady *Altham's* having no Relations in this Kingdom.

The Reason *Catherine O'Neil* gave, that Lady *Altham* was desirous of seeing the Child, but that she feared it might be a Means to turn off the Servants, seems somewhat strange: For let the Consequence be what it will, it is surprising, if Lady *Altham* was told of the Child's Condition, that she should not express a stronger Desire to see him.

There is another Fact that seems very improbable, that is, that Lady *Altham* should not enquire about the Child tho' she survived Lord *Altham* two Years.

The Evidence of Alderman *King* is well worth your Consideration. You are to consider how probable it is, that she should have a Child and not make the least Mention of him in any Conversation during the Time she lodged in his House.

The Defendant's Evidence has mentioned, that Lord *Altham* had the Advice of Counsel, that he was Tenant in Tail, and thereby could levy a Fine, and bar his Issue.—But this bears no great Weight, as his Brother afterwards joined with him; however, by the Opinion of Counsel, he came to a better Market.

The Counsel for the Plaintiff have observed to you, that the Lessor of the Plaintiff was out of the Kingdom, and that he is to take such Witnesses as offer themselves.

You will also observe, how far the improper Acts of the Defendant may affect the Remainder-Men who are innocent thereof.

You are to consider the Manner of Lord *Altham's* Expressions to Lord *Mount Alexander*, and how far they are to be interpreted against the Defendant; as also, the Expressions of Lord *Altham* to Mr. *Medlicott* (as, *I have no Son*) how far that is to be construed for the Defendant.

Gentlemen, you have been extremely attentive to this tedious Affair, and I am certain you will properly weigh the Evidence on both Sides, and apply the Probability and Improbability, where the Nature of the Thing requires it, and agreeable thereto return your Verdict.

[To be concluded in our next.]

To the AUTHOR of the LONDON MAGAZINE.

Our Colonies are all a Part of our own Dominions; and we ought to show an equal Respect to all.

A Mr. *Oglethorpe's* Speech on a Petition of the Sugar Colonies, L. M. 1732, p. 324.

S I R,

A Late Paragraph in the News Papers, which related the Fate of *Annapolis Royal* and its Garrison, has caus'd many and various Reflexions in my Mind on the present State of our Possessions in North America, which now seem, to the eternal Disgrace of their Mother Country, to be left naked and open on all Sides to the Incursions and Ravages of two powerful and irritated Enemies.

On the Northern Frontier, the Effect of our Supineness and Neglect, has been too visible. The Colony next Door to the finest Province of that Continent is dismantled of its principal Fortresses, and that Province itself may soon become the Theatre of more extensive Triumphs to the Enemy. *Quebeck* and the French Possessions in Canada, and at *Cape Breton*, are infinitely more powerful than our Ministry have seem'd to apprehend 'em; and to me, I speak with Submission to better Judgments, it appears quite necessary, whenever attack'd by France, to send Forces, to those Parts, sufficient to repel the Efforts of that Monarchy, and to protect such an important Part of the British Empire from the Miseries and Distresses of War. *New England* is certainly a very opulent and flourishing Colony, and is as capable, or more capable than any in America to protect itself; it has often furnish'd Auxiliaries to the Government, tho' it has as often had a very poor Account of them, as in the truly unfortunate Expedition up the River of *St. Laurence*, under Sir *Howenden Walker* and General *Hill*, &c. But it can never be suppos'd that they can, during a long and tedious War, support themselves without our Assistance, against a Neighbour, whose Military is three Times as strong. Their Militia is well disciplin'd, 'tis true; but the French are able to pour down upon 'em, at any Time, 8 or 10,000 regular Forces, little inferior to those of Europe. *New York*, that thriving, industrious Settlement, is worse off than the other, and two or three independent Companies, who have long rusted in Inactivity, are a very paltry Defence against their lively and alert Neighbours, who can overwhelm 'em with many thousand barbarous Indians, whom they have en-

tirely



ely at their Command, and against whom the Indians in our Alliance are but a small Resource. The Regiment of *Philips*, which was destroy'd at *Canfo* and *Annapolis*, were, I'm pretty sure, the principal Defence of Land Forces these two beneficial Countries, and *Nova Scotia* had; and this is now lost. What a deplorable Situation are they reduc'd to! and, I'm afraid, the so much talk'd of Assistance for these, and the other Plantations, will arrive too late to be of much Service.

That our Colonies in *North America* are of great Importance to the Wealth and Strength of their Mother Country, is too notorious, and has been too often prov'd, to afford the least Pretence for a Denial; tho' I remember under our late M—y a contrary Doctrine was propagated; they were call'd Loads and Burdens, and were with'd at the Bottom of the Sea: But sure our present discerning Ad—tor is not of the same Sentiments, tho' we have too much Reason to suspect it. A Stranger to their Greatness and Trade would be surpriz'd to see their fine Ports and Harbours, in Time of Peace, crowded with Vessels freighted from and to all Parts of the World; of which the numerous Entries at the Out Ports of *England* and *Scotland*, to *Holland*, *France*, *Spain*, *Portugal*, and all Parts of the *Mediterranean* and *Levant*, are a thorough Witness. In Time of Distress what Reliefs have they not afforded us from their plentiful Granaries! The late hard Seasons have inform'd us. How happy are we in this Time of War, to be able to command the Timber, Hemp and Tar of *New England* and *North Carolina*, and the other naval Stores, the Provinces of this North Continent supply us with! Our Possessions in the *West Indies* are almost entirely supply'd by 'em with every Necessary of Life, and Materials for the manufacturing and curing their Commodities.

Thus interested, however, in their Preservation, we see 'em ready to fall a Prey to our Enemies, whilst, in vain, they supplicate for Relief, which, if granted, will be too dilatory for the End propos'd.

On the Southern Frontier of all our Dominions in this Part of the World, Things are much worse situated, from a most unfortunate Complication of Events. The only Man, who had it in his Power to put a Stop to the Mischiefs that a thriving infant Colony, which he so greatly maintain'd against Invaders, and all its Neighbours are threatned with, has been oblig'd to return home, to vindicate himself from

the rude Attacks of his wrong-headed Inferiors, (which were but too much believ'd, before he could have an Opportunity to clear himself) and to procure such Supports as he had long wrote for in vain, tho' absolutely necessary for his Majesty's Service. His Reputation is clear'd even by the Confession of Malice itself; but where are the Forces so absolutely necessary for the Services he propos'd? These are not heard of, and I tremble for the Fate of the Handful of brave Fellows he has left behind him: Men who have follow'd that hardy, vigilant Commander, thro' a constant Series of uncommonly difficult Service, where often Hunger and Thirst have been the least Ill they have suffer'd; and Men whose Destiny can't fail of including that of the greatest Part of that Continent.

'Tis not deny'd by any one now, that I know of, that *Georgia*, consider'd with regard to its own growing Worth, which has receiv'd so many Blows from its Enemies, domestick and foreign, is worth preserving, and is likely to yield Interest to *Great Britain* for what it has cost her. This is a Truth, that even its Enemies in *Carolina* will confess; and its Importance and Utility, nay, the absolute Necessity of it as a Frontier, can't be deny'd. The *Spaniards* are so sensible of it, that they neither have spar'd, nor will spare any Cost to conquer it; and at the Court of *Madrid*, St. *Augustine*, on many Accounts that I could mention, is reckon'd the *Gibraltar* of *America*; nay, the Pope, and whole Catholick Interest are concern'd in its Preservation; and, if I'm not mistaken, a large Subsidy is paid by the *Roman Pontiff*, to his Catholick Majesty, for that Purpose. If it was not taken when General *Oglethorpe* laid Siege to it, we must blame ourselves, who afforded him only such Assistance as were rather Enemies to the Design than Auxiliaries\*. That he wanted none of the Requisites for the Undertaking in his own Person or Regiment, is plain from the great Actions they have perform'd since, which requir'd the utmost Pitch of human Fortitude, soldierly Skill, and thoughtful Prudence. But where is the Difficulty of chasing them away quite from that Continent now? Why don't we employ some Part of our numerous Force in such an Expedition? As an *Englishman* I wish it, for the Honour, Advantage and Security of my native Country. We are certifi'd that we have all their Country open to us, and nothing but their Town to conquer†. But, at least,

\* *Vide* Lieut. Cadogan's *Spanish Hireling*, and his other Pieces in that Dispute; and the late Lieut. Hugh Mackay's Letter on the Affair at *Moosa*. † *Vide* Mr. G. L. Campbell's Relation of a late Expedition to St. *Augustine* on *Florida*, printed for T. Astley.

least, why don't we secure the important Provinces of *South Carolina, Virginia, &c.* by sending more Forces to that Part of the World, whose Sons so much deserve it of us? 'Tis well known, the Design of the *Spaniards* in the late Invasion of *Georgia*, was to have laid waste, and retain'd all those Parts; and they are too much convinc'd of the Facility they may perform it with in our present Situation there, to have entirely dropt that Design.

What would be of most Importance to their Safety, I begin now to despair of, the speedy Return of the General; for as the Papers inform me of his having enter'd into Schemes of domestick Happiness, it can never be suppos'd that he will again tempt all the Dangers and Difficulties \* he has pass'd, in Opposition to so much black Ingratitude, Calumny and Neglect. Tho', I'm sure, from what I hear of his Character †, he would surmount all private Considerations to serve the Cause of his suffering Country, could he be certain they would any Way answer the End propos'd, in any Place or Climate; but as Things remain, I fancy he, or any Gentleman of his Rank, who may pretend to so much Consideration in *Europe*, will not expose themselves to tempestuous Seas, and all the barbarous Rage of unusual War in those distant, far distant Regions, follow'd by all the Mortifications that he has met with in his humane and great Undertakings.

AMERICUS.

To the AUTHOR of the LONDON  
MAGAZINE.

SIR,

THE Turn that has been lately given to the Affairs of *Europe* by *Prussia's* invading *Bohemia*, is of so interesting a Nature, and some of the Reasons he gives for his Conduct are of such Consequence to this Nation in particular, that it deserves the most serious Consideration of every *British* Subject. — This Turn, it is pretended by some Gentlemen amongst us, neither was, nor could be foreseen; which Pretence is to me the more surprising, because what has now happened has been often plainly and expressly foretold in the Debates of your *Political Club*; and tho' our Ministers have not for many Years given the World any great Proofs of their Sagacity, yet they have, surely, as much as any of your young Politicians, who, it is plain, not

only foresaw, but have foretold this fatal Event. — But as most of our modern Readers, read only for Amusement, without so much as ever once reflecting upon, and consequently without remembering any Thing of what they read, I hope, you will give this a Place in your *Magazine*, in order to refresh the Memory of such Readers, and to take this Pretence away from those, who either ignorantly, or deceitfully make use of it.

*L. Volumnius*, in a Speech inserted in your *Magazine* for *May 1743*, foretels, That in case we should attempt to restore the House of *Austria* to its former Power and Grandeur, all, or most of the Princes of *Germany* would declare against us. — *C. Helvius*, in his Speech against the *Hanover* Troops, has these remarkable Words: *London Magazine* for *Dec. last*, P. 583, Col. 2. F. Nay, if such a Design (meaning a Design to attack *France*) should once appear manifest, and be at the Beginning attended with a little Success, I am persuaded, that most of the Princes of *Germany* would declare against us, and even *Hanover* itself would refuse its Assistance. — And *Julius Florus*, in his Speech published in your *Mag.* for *Jan. last*, after informing us of our Ministers having advised the Queen of *Hungary* not to accept of the Terms offered by *France* and the Emperor two Years ago, proceeds thus, p. 273, Col. 2. B.

This, Sir, was a Conduct in our Ministers so very extraordinary, so directly opposite to the Interest of this Nation, and the Security of the Balance of Power, that I can suggest to myself no one Reason for it, but their being resolved to put this Nation to the Expence of maintaining 16000 *Hanoverians*; and this, I am afraid, was the true Motive our new Ministers had at first for all the warlike Measures they resolved on. Nothing would now satisfy us but a Conquest of *Alsace* and *Lorraine*, in order to give it to the Queen of *Hungary* as an Equivalent for what she had lost; and this we resolved on, or at least pretended to resolve on, at a Time when *France* and *Spain* were in close Conjunction, at a Time when no one of the Powers of *Europe* would assist us, at a Time when none of them entertained any Jealousy of the ambitious Designs of *France*, and at a Time when most of the Princes of *Germany* entertained such a Jealousy of the Power of the House of *Austria*, that we

\* *Vide Mr. Moore's Voyage to Georgia*, printed for *J. Robinson*; the above Relation, the publick Accounts of the Invasion, and many other Pieces that speak largely of his Hardships, &c.  
† Which is thus describ'd by an immortal Pen:

— With a vast benevolence of soul,  
To range, like *Oglethorpe*, from pole to pole.

Pope.



had great Reason to apprehend the whole Germanick Body, or at least the most considerable Princes of Germany, joining against us, in case we should meet with any Success. Sir, if our Ministers were really serious in this Scheme, it was one of the most romantick that ever entered into the Head of any English Don Quixote; and if they made this only a Pretence for putting this Nation to the Expence of maintaining 16000 Hanoverians, or of acquiring some new Territory for the Electorate of Hanover, I am sure, no British House of Commons ought to approve of their Conduct.

He adds: 'I am really surpris'd how the Queen of Hungary came to trust a second Time to our Promises; for I may venture to prophesy, that she will find herself a second Time deceived. We shall only put ourselves to a vast needless Expence, as we did when she was first attacked by Prussia; and may give France a Pretence for conquering Flanders, without raising any Jealousy in the other Powers of Europe, which otherwise she could not have done. Or we may bring the Queen of Hungary a second Time to the Verge of Destruction, and leave her there; for that we shall certainly do, as soon as Hanover comes to be a second Time in Danger.'

From these few Quotations it will appear, that the Treaty of Frankfort was not only foreseen, but foretold by some of the young Gentlemen of your Club; and, indeed, from the present Complexion of our Government, such a Treaty could not but be expected; for when our Government appears so evidently to be under the Influence of Hanoverian Counsels, a close Union between the Families of Austria and Brunswick could not but raise a Jealousy in the other great Families of Germany, especially that of Brandenburg, and this Jealousy necessarily threw them into the Arms of France, as the only Power that could protect them against the dangerous Effects of such a formidable Union.—We might therefore have foreseen, that an Attack upon France would necessarily produce a Confederacy in Germany against us; and the same Cause may prevent our being able to form any counter Confederacy, as was last Winter foretold by the Author of a Pamphlet, called, *The Detector Detected*, whose Words are as followeth, *viz.*

'This, (meaning the Resentment or Interest of Hanover) is the true Cause of any Share we have yet taken, or may be obliged to take in the present War in Germany, let the Consequence be what it will. I wish it may be successful; but if it is not, our new Ministers are alone to blame.'

'If they had stood by their old Friends, till Satisfaction had been given to a much injured People, and the Nation taken out of foreign Leading-strings, by the Settlement of a national Administration, the Dutch would have joined sincerely and heartily with us, because they could have put Confidence in this Nation, when governed by domestick and popular Councils; but they can put no Confidence in us, when governed by foreign Councils that are both hated and despised by the People: If our Armies had been under no Influence but True English, the Dutch Troops would not have been prevented from encamping in a Line with the other allied Troops, by pretending to make them yield the Post of Honour, not only to the Hanover Troops in British Pay, but even to the Troops of Hanover that served there as Electoral Troops. The King of Prussia would have joined with us, because he could have put Confidence in the Guaranty of Great Britain, when governed by British Councils; but he can put no Confidence in those Councils, which were but lately forming Schemes for dispossessing him of the greatest Part of his Dominions. In short, when British Councils are governed by British Influence alone, every Sovereign State in Europe will readily join with us, in pulling down the Power of any one State that becomes formidable to all the rest; because, as it is against our Interest to have any Dominions upon the Continent, they can never be apprehensive of our designing to encroach upon any of them. Whereas when our Councils are but suspected of being under the Influence of any foreign State, all the Neighbours of that foreign State will be jealous of us, and apprehensive, lest the Riches and Power of Great Britain should be turned towards extending the Dominions of that foreign State, by which our Councils are supposed to be directed; and I heartily wish this very Jealousy may not at present detach from our Interest, not only the King of Prussia, but the Kingdom of Sweden, and the potent Empire of Russia. This shews how necessary it was for us to have established a national and independent Administration, before we took any Part in the present War: If we had, we might very probably have been able to form a Confederacy that would have commanded Success, unless Providence had declared against us, which, in so just a Cause, we had no Reason to fear, especially as our Armies would have been commanded by the best Generals, and our Councils directed by the best and wisest Men in the Nation.'

Thus

# 448 *The Queen of Hungary's Reply to the Prussian Minister.*

Thus it appears, that however desperate the Circumstances of the Queen of Hungary and of this Nation may be at present, however deplorable they may be rendered by the Event of the War, they are owing to Causes which were foretold, and could not but be foreseen even by our Ministers. —What the Event of the War may be, Time alone can discover. —At present it has a very uncomfortable Aspect; and, I wish, we may not find verified what is mentioned in *A Private Conference* (lately published) between two Hanoverian Ministers, by one of whom it is said, *That the Resentment of France against Hanover may at any Time be pacified by a Sacrifice of some of the British Possessions.* I am,

Sept. 14, 1744.

Tours, &c.

*The QUEEN of HUNGARY'S REPLY to the MANIFESTO, which Count DOHNA, the Prussian Minister, read at the Court of Vienna.*

## *The PREFACE.*

**T**HIS present Writing was drawn up with an Intent to send it to the Queen's Secretary of the Embassy at Berlin, Mr. Weingarten; in order, if possible, to prevent the coming to a Rupture. But the contrary seems to have been resolved upon by the other Side, and that they were determin'd not to desist from the Resolution, which they had already taken, to commence new Hostilities. For as on the one Side, Count Dohna could not be persuaded to deliver in Writing the threatening Declaration which he had read; so on the other Side, great Haste has been made at Berlin, to communicate the Contents thereof in the Manner of a Manifesto to the Publick, before this Writing could possibly be deliver'd to the said Secretary.

The said Manifesto being thus published, there is no Doubt but the *Breslau-Treaty*, concluded by the Mediation and Guaranty of Great Britain, will be broke thro', if it is not already, in the same Manner as the Convention made at *Little Schnellendorff*.

But tho' the End which was propos'd to be obtain'd by drawing up this Reply to the aforesaid threatening Declaration, or rather Denunciation of War, is not now attainable, we would not yet depart from our former Manner of Writing, much less use the Expressions which our high Adversary (*meaning the Emperor*) has set us an Example of, and are amongst crown'd Heads always indecent. We have therefore thought it unnecessary to give any other Reply to the *Prussian Manifesto* of War, than this present Writing. The Rejoicings of the Queen's unjust Enemies upon this

(in a few Years) third Breach of the Peace by *Prussia*, are easily to be imagined. But as it is not enough to be wondered at, that notwithstanding the Queen's demonstrated Love of Peace, and wish'd for Reconciliation, her high Adversary has been pleased to charge himself with such a heavy Defence to God, his Country, and to Posterity: So we on our Part, who make not a Jest of what has hitherto in all human Societies been kept sacred, have firm Confidence in the just God, that in the End will be verify'd that Saying, *Non est consilium contra Dominum.*

**T**hen follows the Convention of Little Schnellendorff, the principal Articles of which are, That the King of Prussia shall be at Liberty to take the Town of *Neiss* in Manner of a Siege. That the Commander of the Town of *Neiss* shall have Orders to hold out a Siege of 14 Days, and then to deliver up the said Place to his Prussian Majesty's Troops. That after the taking the Town of *Neiss*, the King of Prussia shall not any more act offensively, neither against the Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, nor against the King of England, as Elector of *Hanover*, nor against any one of the Queen's present Allies, until a general Peace. That the King of Prussia shall never demand any more from her Hungarian Majesty, than the *Lower Silesia*, with the Town of *Neiss*. That her Hungarian Majesty shall cede unto his Prussian Majesty, all the *Lower Silesia* to the River *Neiss*, the Town of *Neiss* included, and on the other Side of the *Oder* unto the ordinary Limits of the Dukedom of *Oppelen*, with all the Sovereignty and Dependence whatsoever.

## *The REPLY.*

**D**UE Report having been made to the Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, of the Declaration which the King of Prussia's Minister, Count Dohna, immediately before his Departure for *Scutgard*, read to those of her Majesty four Times over:

Her Majesty could have wished the said Minister might have been prevailed upon to deliver his Declaration in Writing, not only on Account of the Importance and Delicacy of the Affair; and that on such Occasions it is usual, nay, even absolutely necessary, in order to prevent Mistakes; but also, more especially, because such Things are there laid to her Majesty's Charge, as are directly contrary to the Purity, Moderation, and Peaceableness of her Intentions; as would very easily be made appear, if what the King of Prussia pretends were his real Designs, no Body having them more at Heart than herself.



This Count *Dobna* was told immediately, and that his *Prussian* Majesty would do but justice to her Majesty's Way of thinking, by being thoroughly convinced, that her only Aim is, the Preservation of the System of the Empire, and of the Liberties and Prerogatives of its Members, and the restoring Tranquillity to all Germany, by a just, safe, and lasting Peace.

But since Count *Dobna* absolutely refus'd giving any Part of his Declaration in Writing, as being expressly forbid it by his Court: All that can be done, is, first, to set down what could be recollected of its Contents from his Readings, and then to subjoin what may serve to clear and answer them.

This is the Substance of Count *Dobna*'s Declaration, as near as can be remember'd.

"That immediately after the Peace concluded at *Breslau*, it was declared in the Name of his *Prussian* Majesty, that, altho' he would not meddle with the Differences the Queen had with other Powers, she would deceive herself in thinking that he, as one of the most considerable Electors, would see with Indifference, that the Imperial Dignity should be oppress'd, the Constitutions of the Empire alter'd, or any Violence done to its Members. But that neither this, nor other Warnings and Overtures, merely designed for the Good of the House of *Austria* itself, had any Effect; and that, to the great Dishonour of the whole Electoral College, the lawfully-elected Head of the Empire had been vilified, well-intentioned States of the Empire intimidated or oppress'd, and others stirred up against their Head, or drawn into Confederacies against him. That thereby his *Prussian* Majesty found himself necessitated to enter, with some considerable States of the Empire, into a Treaty of Union, which the Queen could not be ignorant of, since Baron *Palm* had sent the Project of it to Count *Rosenberg*; but that, there being no Hopes of obtaining the End proposed by good Offices alone, his *Prussian* Majesty, as in Duty bound to the Empire and its Head, could not help lending the Emperor a Number of his Troops as Auxiliaries. That with Reluctancy he came to this Extremity, which ought not to be imputed to him, but to the Court of *Vienna* and its Allies alone; and to their rejecting all equitable Means of Accommodation. That his *Prussian* Majesty nevertheless persisted in the unalterable Resolution, faithfully to fulfil all his Engagements with the neighbouring Powers, and to meddle upon no Account with the Contentions which the Queen has with other Powers, and don't concern the Empire; since he has no other End but to preserve and support the System and Bond of the Empire, the Dig-

nity of its lawfully-elected Head, the Liberties and Prerogatives of its Members, and to restore Tranquillity in Germany, by a just and lasting Peace."

To all which Count *Dobna* was ordered to add: "That no Elector or Prince of the Empire, who was a true Patriot, could suffer to see the Head of the Empire not only deprived of his hereditary Dominions, but utterly rooted out of Germany by his Troops being driven out of it; a Proceeding not to be matched in the History of the Empire, and which Posterity will scarce give Credit to; from whence universal Danger must ensue to all the Members of the Empire, and to each of them; so that no other Resort would be left to any of them, but that of being last undone. Wherefore his *Prussian* Majesty found himself indispensably obliged to recur to such Measures as might be most effectual to provide for his own and the publick Safety, and such as the present Juncture of Affairs, and the Dangers inevitably arising from any farther Delay did require; which the Court of *Vienna* ought to blame themselves for, and themselves alone, as having urged the Empire and its Members beyond all Manner of Patience."

It may easily be imagined, how much the Queen was struck with so unfriendly a Declaration, as threatening as utterly groundless; and the rather, since the ready Execution of the Project of Union communicated by Baron *Palm*, could but confirm her Majesty's Surmise of the Private Articles annex'd to that Project being sign'd likewise, tho, equally inconsistent with the System of the Empire, and the Peace of *Breslau*.

There is no need to refute the Imputations thrown out, not only upon the Queen, but upon all her Allies, and by far the greatest Number of the States of the Empire, who are equally solicitous with her Majesty and her Allies for the System and Welfare of the Empire. All that may be said on this Head is already contain'd in the Queen's Declaration, brought to the Dictature of the Empire the 3d of July, in her Answer to the King of *France*'s Declaration of War, and in her Circular Rescript of the 18th of July last.

The Queen's Declaration, dictated the 3d of July, is a clear and authentick Proof, 1. That the Precautions she us'd neither were, nor could be meant to injure in the least the Rights and Prerogatives of the Electoral College, or those of any State of the Empire; but merely to assert and guard her own Rights, according to the plain Tenour of the Golden Bull. 2. That the Protest her Majesty founded thereupon did

not regard the Result of the Election; but only the Manner of proceeding in it. 3. That her Majesty is very ready to desist from this Protest, as soon as due Satisfaction shall be given her for the past, and sufficient Security for the future. 4. That her Majesty still perseveres in all that she, out of Love of Peace, has proffer'd, both by the said Declaration, and by her Letter of the 11th of *February*, written to the Assembly of the Circle of *Suabia*; and wishes nothing more sincerely, than that the Remonstrances made thereupon to her High Adversary, by the truly well-intention'd Electors and States of the Empire, may at last have the desir'd Effect upon him.

It is notorious to the whole Empire, and to all *Europe*, what happen'd with relation to the Electoral Vote of *Bohemia*, and how her Majesty's third Ambassador sent to assist at the Election, was treated at *Frankfort*. In such Circumstances, could her Majesty do less than she has done in Vindication of her own undeniable Right? Or shew more Moderation, than by declaring before-hand, as she has done, her Readiness to withdraw her Protestation lodg'd in the Diet?

If the King of *Prussia* would but please to put himself in her Majesty's Place, as in Equity he should, and consider what Resolutions he should have taken, had the Electoral Vote of *Brandenburg* been dealt with as that of *Bohemia*, it would be impossible for him not to acknowledge the Justice of her Majesty's Conduct in that Respect, instead of inveighing, as he does, against it; especially after he had so often declared, by his Minister, that he found no Fault at all with the Care her Majesty took to preserve her own Rights and Prerogatives. And if, according to the Declaration read by Count *Dobna*, so much Regard and Attention is shewn for the Preservation of the Liberties and Prerogatives of other States of the Empire, why should the same be refused to the Queen alone, contrary to the first Article of the Treaty of *Breslau*, especially when it is consider'd, in how moderate and becoming a Manner her Majesty has acted in that Respect, in that solemn Declaration of hers, which has been brought to the Dictature of the Empire?

At the Time of the Treaty of *Breslau* this Declaration had not been made yet, but the Protests had already appeared in Print, and were in every Body's Hands, and at the Court of *Prussia* too; and as by that Declaration, which followed the Protests, whatever was thought capable in the said Protests of giving the least Offence, not only in the Opinion of the one Side, but also in the Opinion of the major Part of the Electoral College, as well as other

States of the Empire, was actually left out, and alter'd, how can the Queen be possibly accused of Disregard for the said Electoral College, or that she gave Occasion to the breaking of the Peace, by those Amendments of the said Protests, which were approv'd of by most of the States of the Empire, when even those Protests, tho' couch'd in much stronger Terms, did not hinder the Conclusion of the said Peace? The greatest Part of the Electoral College can no more be suspected, than the Queen, of neglecting the Prerogatives of the said College, of which her Majesty deems it an Honour to be a Member; and nothing can be alledg'd in this Respect against her Majesty, but what must bear with equal Force against all those Electors, Princes, and States of the Empire, who, as well as her Majesty, are anxious about, and careful of the Preservation of the oldest and fundamental Law of the Empire, the Golden Bull, and of the Treaty of publick Peace, as well as that of *Westphalia*. And how can any one be even suspected of infringing in the least the Constitution of the Empire, who pretends to nothing but what is agreeable to the fundamental Laws thereof? As long as these are attended and referred to, as her Majesty constantly does, sure the Constitution of the Empire can never be thought in Danger.

In the abovemention'd Answer of ours to the *French* Declaration of War, a full and faithful Account has been given of all the Proposals made for a Peace and Reconciliation, that ever came to the Knowledge of the Court of *Vienna*, except that only, which, out of a particular Regard for his *Prussian* Majesty, has hitherto been concealed. Count *Dobna*, upon the above Declaration being read to him, was himself obliged to own, that since *November* last he had not receiv'd from his Court any the least Instruction nor Order on this Account; and that he had not spoke one Word about it since that Time. A Copy of the Answer, which was given him concerning both the Reconciliation and the Election also, may be referr'd to again with so much the less Difficulty, as it can hardly be believed that, if his *Prussian* Majesty had been rightly inform'd of the true State of the Matter, he would ever have resolv'd to come to such a threatening Declaration as his is, for not agreeing to such Proposals as were made by him; a Declaration, which his own Minister refus'd to give a Copy of, and of which no other Intimation has been given to the Court of *Vienna*. To declare War upon such Pretences, nay, even to come to the Effect, would hardly be credited by Posterity, nor could one find



a single Instance of it in History, either that of the Empire, or any other History. It can therefore never be supposed that these are the true Sentiments of his *Prussian* Majesty; and the less, as it is obvious, that by these Means the *Compages Imperii*, [Bond and Ties of the Empire,] far from being preserved, would be entirely destroyed; and instead of re-establishing the Tranquillity of the Empire, it would only increase the Troubles, would throw it into the greatest Dangers of an entire Overthrow; and in short, all the Bonds of human Society be torn asunder.

As to the pretended Proposals of Peace, none can ever be produced but what has been mentioned in the Answer to the *French* Declaration of War; unless indeed they have an Eye to what was insinuated to Lord Hyndford last *January* was a twelve Month, and which for the above Reason has hitherto been kept secret, *viz.* that upon Lord Hyndford's declaring in his Master's Name, how ready his *British* Majesty was to contribute to the utmost to the Reconciling of the two Courts of *Vienna* and *Frankfort*, nay even to the Advantage of the latter, as far as could be done without Prejudice to the Queen, and to the Constitution of the Empire; in such a Manner however, as to disengage the Emperor from the Court of *France*, and enable him to act in a free and independent Manner from that Court. Upon which his *Prussian* Majesty reply'd, that some sat Bishoprick, such as *Salzburg*, ought to be secularized: *Qu'il faudroit seculariser quelques bons Eveques, comme Salzburg.*

If hitherto nothing of this has been made publick, it was entirely owing to the abovementioned great Regard, nor would it have been discovered even now, if the present extream Necessity had not obliged to it. There is no Doubt but that her Majesty and the Archducal House would have found their Advantage also in the Execution of such a Scheme, but that her Conscience could not allow her to come into it.

And as it is impossible to reconcile such a Scheme with the Constitution of the Empire, with the just Titles and Prerogatives of the States of it, with the Tranquillity of the same, &c. that on the contrary it plainly and undeniably aimed at the Oppression of innocent States of the Empire, and the Destruction of its whole System: Her Majesty is quite at a Loss about the Meaning of those Imputations contained in the Declaration read by Count *Dobna*, as if it was her that had been guilty of such Violations and Infringements of the great Objects abovementioned. Whereas it is

evident, that if the Queen could have come into that Scheme which was proposed to her, and which she thought inconsistent with the said Objects, the threatening Declaration that now followed it, would never have been thought of.

As to the Objection drawn from the Case of the *Bavarian* Troops; this has been fully answered beforehand in the circular Rescript, Numb. 3. abovementioned, of the 18th of last Month. The Agreement made at *Nieder Schoenfelden*, the two Rescripts made to the particular Diet of the Circle of *Suabia*, the Exhortations and Sollicitations contain'd therein, and after all, the Regard paid to those dispersed

Troops for so considerable a Time, in not attacking nor troubling them, are all undeniable Proofs of the Sincerity of her Majesty's Sentiments, and of her Disposition towards a solid Reconciliation. But when after this, the said Troops were employed in the Service of *France*, and have been found joined to the *French* as Auxiliaries to

them, and upon a Territory which that Crown makes Pretensions to, to the Prejudice of the Empire, and which in Reality they endeavoured to maintain against the Empire; considering all these Circumstances, it is quite inconceivable what can be meant by what Count *Dobna* has been obliged to add afterwards to the Declaration. But least of all is it possible to reconcile with all these undeniable Circumstances, the positive Declaration of his *Prussian* Majesty, that his Majesty was resolved not to meddle with, nor interfere in any Difference which the Queen may have with other Powers, and that he would faithfully fulfil all his Engagements with the Queen, against other neighbouring Powers.

The Empire, at present, is no longer the Seat of War; and if her Majesty endeavours to join again to it some Countries that were torn from it, sure it cannot be said under any Pretence whatever, that it is a Thing contrary to the Honour, Dignity, Constitution, Safety, and Tranquillity of it.

And, as the Queen has often declared, and most solemnly repeats it again, that she does not desire to aggrandize her Dominions, but only to get a reasonable Indemnification and Security for the future; those very Endeavours of her Majesty just now mentioned, tended at once to procure the wish'd-for Reconciliation, and might still procure it, if they are not obstructed and a Stop put to, by the putting in Execution such a threatening Declaration.

All and every Country belonging to the Empire, had actually enjoyed a perfect Tranquillity, was it not for the *Prussian* great Preparations of War, and the Moti-

ons of their Troops. The Difficulty concerning the Election is removed of itself, since her Majesty's Declaration has been brought to the Dictature of the Empire, as soon as her Majesty's Rights founded in the Golden Bull are preserved and secured. And except in the Case of a necessary Self-Defence against declared Enemies, no one State, even the least of the Empire, has received the least Harm on our Side, her Majesty the Queen not being used to offer Violence to any Body. And as to the Article of Reconciliation, all that could possibly be said on this Score, without putting aside the necessary Caution with respect to Enemies, nor the Fidelity due to Allies, is abundantly contained in the Answer to the *French Declaration of War*.

His *Prussian Majesty* was not unacquainted before, nor after the Treaty of *Breslau*, made under the Mediation and Guaranty of *Great Britain*, with her Majesty's Desire of being indemnified for the great Sacrifice she made by it, and of having Security for the future.

And both the Moderation and Equity of such a Demand cannot be called in Question, but by those alone who will put themselves above the first and fundamental Rules both of the Law of Nature and Nations, as well as those of the Empire in particular. It is from the Justice of these Demands, and their being acknowledged as such by the Court of *Prussia*, that the abovementioned Proposals, made to Lord *Hyndford*, were derived, and which according to the Declaration read by Count *Dobna* tended so much to the Advantage of the Archducal House, but which the Queen could never accept of, as they tended to the Prejudice of an innocent third State, and of other \* less powerful Protestant States of the Empire. [The rest in our next.]

Since the Account publish'd by Authority, concerning the late Engagement near *Toulon*, has been censur'd as obscure, (see p. 142.) and all the other Accounts have been thought partial and malicious; the best Thing we can do at present for the Information of our Readers, is to give them the following ORIGINAL LETTERS and PAPERS between *Adm——l M——ws*, and *V. Adm——l L——k*, in relation to that Affair.

*Adm——l M——ws* to *V. Adm——l L——k*.

*S I R*, *Russel*, at Sea, Feb. 12. 1743.

I Am exceedingly sorry you did not judge proper; when I had made the Signal to

engage the Enemy, to bear down yourself, or at least to have made the Signal for a sufficient Number of your Squadron, to have endeavoured to cut off the five *Spanish Men of War*, that were in the Rear of the *Spanish Admiral*. Such an extraordinary Proceeding of yours greatly surprizes me, and I hope you will be able to give me a very good Reason for such your Conduct.

A In case we should see the Enemy, when I make the Signal for the Line of Battle a-head of each other, you are to lead with your Squadron; let it be with the Star-board or Larboard Tacks, in regard the Rear Admiral's Masts are much wounded; and for ought I yet know, so may be the *Princess Caroline's*, and *Cbicbester*, who B were engaged with him. I am,

Sir, Your most Obedient Servant,  
T——M——ws.

To R——d L——k, Esq; &c.

*Adm——l M——ws's Letter which accompanied his Queries to V. Adm——l L——k.*

*S I R*, *Namur*, off *Mabon*, Feb. 20, 1743.

C I Writ you a Letter the 12th Instant, to which I have had no Answer; I judge it my Duty to send you the inclosed Queries, which I desire you will be pleased to answer, and transmit to him, who is,

*S I R*, Your most Obedient,  
Humble Servant,  
T——M——ws.

D To R——d L——k, Esq; &c.

*Vice A——l L——k's Letter, and Answer to the above Letters of A——l M——ws.*

*S I R*, *Neptune*, off *Mabon*, Feb. 21, 1743.

E I Received your Letter of Yesterday's Date, wherein you take Notice of your having written to me of the 12th Instant, to which I had given you no Answer: I now own the Receipt of that of the 12th, together with the Queries, which I have answered, Part of which answers your Letter of the 12th Instant. I am,

*S I R*, Your most Obedient,  
Humble Servant,  
R——d L——k.

F To the Hon. A——l M——s.

*Queries stated by A——l M——ws, and Answer'd by Vice A——l L——k.*

*The First Query.*

G DID you not see the Signal out for the Line of Battle, when I made the Signal for bringing to, the 10th Instant at Night?

*Answer.*

\* Viz. Some free Imperial Towns, that were to go along with the secularized Bishopsricks, to increase the Bavarian Dominions.



*Answer.*

It being dark, we could see no other than the Night-Signal to bring to.

*Second Query.*

Was it not your Duty to have brought to, in the Line of Battle, agreeable to the Signal then out?

*Answer.*

As a Proof that we were in the Line with you, I think we were within four Miles of the Enemy; and all my Officers that took any Notice affirm, that we were not above three Miles from the Enemy, when we brought to. Several of the *Spanish* Ships edg'd from us soon after we brought to.

*Third Query.*

Your Reason for bringing to, with your Division, at least five Miles to Windward of me, the doing of which you must know would make you be (as the Wind was then) that Distance a-stern of me, as you was when we made Sail.

*Answer.*

I must repeat again, that I was in the Line with you, when we brought to, the Wind at that Time was at E. S. E. at 10 o'Clock it came to E. N. E. at 12, to N. E. at 2, to N. N. E. and continued so till 8 o'Clock in the Morning, which brought us to Windward of you.

*Fourth Query.*

Did you not see the Signal made by me, to engage the Enemy? Your Reason for not repeating the said Signal, and endeavouring to cut off the four sternmost Ships of the Enemy, and for not making the Signal for any of your Division to perform that Service; especially as you had clean Ships in your Division; and also your Reason for shortning Sail, and altering your Course by haling upon a Wind.

*Answer.*

We did see you make the Signal to engage the Enemy, which is never to be repeated, as may be proved by the Words of the 13th Article of the Fighting Instructions, beginning with the Words; 'As soon as the Admiral shall hoist a red Flag on the Flag-Staff, at the Foretop-mast-Head and fire a Gun, every Ship in the Fleet is to use their utmost Endeavour to engage the Enemy, in the Order the Admiral has prescribed unto them.' Which Article leaves no Room for its being repeated; for where repeating is necessary, every Article expresses it shall be repeated. And as I have been in two general Battles, I do affirm, that the Signal for Battle was not repeated in either. In that off *Malaga*, I was Lieutenant to the Admiral of the *White*, who did not

repeat it, nor did any other Flag-Ship, either *English* or *Dutch*.

It was impossible for me to make more Sail than I did; those of my Division a-stern of me, made all the Sail they could, none of which could come within Shot of the sternmost of the Enemy's Ships; those of my Division, that were a-head of me, were the *Dunkirk* and *Cambridge*, both which Ships could have made more Sail, but they kept to Windward of their Station, particularly the *Dunkirk*. And tho' there was but little Wind with a Swell, yet as they sailed well, it was my Opinion, they might have stopt those four Ships of the Enemy, until I and my Division got up; therefore I fired a Shot to Windward of them, and at the same Time made the Captain of the *Dunkirk*'s Signal, but to no Purpose.

I kept bearing down, until I found I should not be more than able to get into the Wake of the sternmost Ship of the Enemy. Farther, to divert her from getting up to the Protection of the *Spanish* Admiral, as the only Remedy left me to bring on an Engagement, at the Distance I was off, I fired a Broadside; the return'd it, sheer'd farther from me, and made more Sail towards the *Real*.

In this Situation you haled down your Signal to engage, and made the Signal to leave off Chace. I immediately shortned Sail; you haled your Wind, I did the same; as it appeared to me, to protect the Rear-Admiral and his Division, the Van of the *French* Fleet being then tack'd, and endeavouring to double upon him.

From the Time you bore down upon the *Real*, till the Time you made the Signal to leave off Chace, the little Wind and the Distances of the Ships a-stern of me, put it out of my Power to direct the clean Ships, viz. *Elizabeth*, *Buckingham*, and *Revenge*, to go a-head of me; for from that Instant you bore away, it appeared to me, that all the Sail they could make was then abroad, and continued so. Consequently, before this Time, when I neither knew, nor saw, that you intended to attack the *Spaniards*, which, according to the Line of Battle, should have fallen to my Share, it did not become me to make any Alteration in your Line, as by Signal then abroad. But had you been pleased to have dropt a Boat with your Directions to the Ships of your Division, and mine, between you and me, to have attack'd the four mentioned Ships of the Enemy, they would have forced them a-stern, for our coming up.

A—l

*A—l M—ws's Letter, which accompanied his Replies, to Vice A—l L—ck's Answer to the Queries.*

*SIR, Namur, Mahon Harb. Mar. 4, 1743.*

**Y**OU have herewith my Replies to your Answers to the Queries I judg'd proper to desire you to answer; and 'tis with Concern, that I do not judge them satisfactory. I hope you will be pleased to consider well my Replies to them, and to answer them so soon as you shall have so done. I am,

*SIR, Your most humble Servant,*  
*T—s M—ws.*

*To R—d L—k, Esq; &c.*

*A—l M—ws's Replies to Vice A—l L—ck's Answers to the Queries.*

**B**y the *Namur's* Logg-Book the Wind was at E.N.E. when we brought to the 10th of February; and from Ten o'Clock that Night to Six the next Morning, from the N.E. by N. to N.E. *Query*, Whether you ought not to have kept the Line? notwithstanding the Alteration of the Wind, since it was in your Power to have done it; instead of being at Break of Day full five Miles in the Wind's Eye of me; consequently so many Miles a-stern, when I made Sail, which is notorious to the whole Fleet.

It's true, that the 13th Article of the fighting Instructions does not mention, that the Signal for engaging the Enemy shall be repeated by the other Flag Officers; but I have Reason to believe, that every Captain in your Division, for want of their having repeated it, as Rear-A—l R—ck—y did, judg'd he was to keep the Line, and not to make Sail a-head of you, in order to engage; which many of them could and would have done, had they not expected your repeating the Signal.

*Query*, Why did you not set your Stud-sail Sails, and order the Sailing-Ships of your Division to make Sail, and engage the four sternmost Ships of the Enemy, particularly the *Elizabeth*, *Buckingham*, and *Revenge*? And why did you suffer any of your Division to shorten Sail? You say, that the *Cambridge* and *Dunkirk* could have made more Sail, and engaged the four sternmost Ships; and that you fired a Shot at the *Dunkirk*, and made her Commander's Signal, but all to no Purpose; for that he still kept to Windward of you, as did the *Cambridge* likewise. *Query*, Why did you not make the Commander of the *Cambridge's* Signal also? And why did you not send your Lieutenants to com-

mand those two Ships, when you judg'd their Commanders did not do their Duty; and you must have seen, that the Service suffered by their ill Behaviour? Surely, it would have been right to have done so, and I should have thanked you heartily for it; for in the Situation I was, I could not possibly see what was doing a-stern of me.

**A** You are pleased to say, that you fired a Broadside at the four sternmost Ships, and that the Enemy returned it: I take it for granted, that you judg'd yourself to be within Gun-shot of them, else you would not have fired; tho' it seems all your Shot fell short of them. You are likewise pleased to give me for Answer to the last Part of my fourth and last *Query*, viz. that you left off pursuing the Enemy, and clap'd upon a Wind, in order to protect the Rear-Admiral, &c. I must confess, that I am not a little surpris'd at the Reason you are pleased to give me, for breaking the Line of Battle, and quitting the Enemy, so near you as those four Ships were by your own Confession. Had I judg'd Rear A—l R—ck—y in so great

**C** Danger, as you seem to insinuate him to have been in, there is a proper Signal to be made for that Service by the commanding Officer. I must take Leave to affirm, that had you not clapp'd upon a Wind with your whole Division, by all the Accounts I have received, you and your Division (tho' not all your Sail abroad) might,

**D** and must have engaged these sternmost Ships of the *Spaniards*, in one Quarter of an Hour at least, by which Means the *Real* could not have escaped me, as I was within Musket-shot of her, when all the sternmost Ships of the Enemy came up and tore me to Pieces: And I must add,

**E** that your Neglect of that Piece of Service was obvious and plain; and it is certain, that all the Captains in your Division judg'd they were to follow you, notwithstanding the Signal for engaging the Enemy was out. I must take Leave to say, that if you had been pleased to have undeceived them on that Head, it would have been

**F** doing, not only the Duty of an Officer, but likewise a friendly Part to me. To conclude, I must take Leave to tell you, that I am greatly concern'd to find you judg'd it was necessary for me to have dropt a Boat a-stern to order, not only those Ships of my Division a-stern of me, but likewise those of yours (which are in the Line of Battle a-head of you) to do

**G** their Duty. The Situation I was in at that Time, did not permit me to see that such Orders were necessary; but why did you not do it, who was at Leisure, and tell me that such Orders were necessary?

yet,



yet, acted contradictory to your Judgment, by first shortening Sail, and soon after clapping upon a Wind. It therefore appears to me, that you was willing to assist me with your Judgment in doing what was not in your Power to do, viz. to go to the Assistance of Rear Ad—l R—w—y, yet you would not assist me when it was absolutely in your Power, viz. by ordering the Ships in the Rear of my Division to bear down upon the Enemy, to prevent their getting up to the Assistance of the *Real*, and all of them attacking the *Namur*. This, Sir, is under your Hand; but what is more extraordinary, you would not yourself do it, or order any of your Division, to do what you are pleased to tell me I ought to have done; and I take Leave to affirm, that it was absolutely in your Power to have prevented the Enemies Ships getting up to me, either by disabling them, or obliging them to put afore it. In either of the two Cases the *Real* must have been burnt by the Fireship (being, when she blew up, within Pistol-shot of her, and, as I am credibly inform'd, must have sunk by the Shot she received from those Ships of the Enemy, had she not blown up) or have fallen into my Hands, as I was at that Instant of Time within Musket-shot of her.

*Namur, in Mahon*

*Harbour, March T—s M—ws.*  
4, 1743.

*A—l M—ws's Letter to Vice A—l L—ck, requesting an Answer to his Replies.*

*SIR, Namur, Mahon Harb. Mar. 15, 1743.*

AS I cannot close my Packet till I receive your Answer to the *Queries* I sent you the 4th Instant; and it is necessary that I should dispatch a Ship away with the Messenger without Loss of Time; I desire you will be pleased to return me your Answers to the said *Queries*, as soon as you conveniently can. I am,

*SIR, Your most humble Servant,*

*T—s M—ws.*

*Vice A—l L—ck's Answer to the preceding Letter.*

*SIR, Neptune, Mahon Harb. Mar. 15, 1743.*

I HAVE yours of this Date, setting forth, you cannot close your Packet, until you receive my Answers to your *Queries* of the 4th Instant.

The three Days constant Attendance at Courts-Martial, took up so much of my Time, that it has prevented me being able to send them; and as you hinted to me, to consider well your Replies, it has made me

the more circumspect in my Answers, which are almost finished; and I hope will be so by to-morrow Morning. I am, *SIR,*

*Your most obedient, humble Servant,*

*R—d L—k.*

*To the Hon. A—l M—ws.*

[These Answers, other Letters, &c. in our next.]

*Universal Spectator, Aug. 25. and Sept. 1.*

A Correspondent sends Mr. Spectator the following Conversation by way of Dialogue between himself and an Officer of the Centurion, lately return'd with Commodore Anson from the Tour of the World. He first tells him, that the Officer is a Gentleman who has Sense, Philosophy, and Spirits to throw an Air of Pleasantry upon a Series of Hardships and Misfortunes, and that he relates nothing but what he assured him was true.

Voyager. HOW d'ye, my Lad? What! don't you remember me?

Friend. Remember you! Why certainly I know your Face, and should be glad to know if you are the same Man who used to wear it. Tell me, are you really my Friend —?

V. As surely as you are —

F. Return'd from this perilous fatal Voyage! One of the 160 that have escaped out of so many Thousands!

V. Certainly I am, and am ready, for my Country's Service, to engage in another Undertaking of the same Nature.

F. What! Again to go round the World? To encounter Dangers unheard of before? To suffer Wants of every Kind, even of Hope?

V. You Landmen, who try none, are apt to magnify every Difficulty. The Voyage has not been half so bad as it has been represented: At least, I saw nothing in it so terrible.

F. Did not you meet with great Distress of Weather?

V. Yes, We were 40 Days in a continual Storm, a Storm beyond what can be formed by the Imagination of many old Navigators.

F. And was not that terrible?

V. There was a Calm succeeded it. We came soon after into the *Pacifick Ocean*, a Sea that well deserves the Name it bears.

F. Did not you sometimes want necessary and wholesome Provisions, without a Prospect of coming at them?

V. We did: But we met with them afterwards.

F. Your Men, I am told, drop'd off like rotten Sheep, and few among you escaped

escaped a dangerous Sickness: Did not that terrify you?

V. Not considerably. We who recovered, should have been glad that all had lived: But, as they did not, the few remaining had the greater Hopes from what we might acquire.

F. You talk very merrily for one who has been in such Circumstances. But pray, Sir, be a little serious, and tell me what it was supported you under all these Difficulties?

V. A Trust in Providence, and, to keep up that, an Appearance still of Relief when we were driven to the greatest Extremity. By the long Continuance of the Storm it became every Day more familiar; and when it ceased, we tasted the Pleasure of gentle Gales beyond what was ever painted in poetical or romantick Description. The temporary Want of Provisions, whenever it happened, made the Acquisition of them Luxury, and gave a Relish beyond all the Arts of French Cookery. After we had been accustomed, for some Time, to throw overboard 12 or 15 Men of a Day, we thought we had a Redundance of Health when the Number was reduced to 6 or 8.

F. But for your own Part, in those Times of Mortality, was you not continually in Apprehensions for yourself?

V. Death, by being so much among us, grew less frightful than you can imagine. But to answer directly to your Question, I was never afraid of him, except when I was immediately attack'd. You know I had always a good Heart, and an enterprising Genius.—I had a strong Opinion, when I went out, that I should come home again, and that I should be a greater Man at the End than I was at the Beginning of the Voyage: This Opinion never entirely left me, even when my Life depended upon my being put opportunely on Shore.

F. A useful Opinion indeed, to keep up your Spirits almost in Contempt of Probability.—But had you nothing but this Opinion, and the Trust in Providence you just now mentioned, to depend upon?

V. We had the Example of a brave, humane, equal-minded, prudent Commander, which indeed was no small Matter.

F. You would do me the greatest Pleasure in relating a few Instances of that Conduct, which could induce you, whom I know to be so good a Judge of Mankind, to give him so great a Character.

V. And there is nothing I can relate with either more Pleasure, or more Justice. In general then, his Temper was so steady and unruffled, that the Men and Officers all look'd on him with Wonder and Delight, and could not for Shame betray any

great Dejection under the most imminent Danger.—When we were maroon'd in the uninhabited Island of *Timan*, at the Distance of 7 or 800 Leagues from the Continent of *Asia*, and had little Hopes of ever recovering our Ship, the Commodore—

F. I beg your Pardon a little: The Accident you mention I have not before heard of: Pray, in what Manner did it happen?

V. The Ship (for we had then but one) was driven from her Moorings, only a few Men being on board, and the Commodore, with 150 of us, refreshing ourselves on Land. We lost her for about 20 Days, and began almost to despair of her ever returning. In those Circumstances then the Commodore encouraged us to lengthen and fit up our Boat, which was left behind, in the best Manner, that we might try our Fortune in her at Sea, in Case of the worst. Nor was this all, under such Distress he put himself upon a Level with the meanest Sailor in his Crew; wrought himself with the Axe and Saw in cutting the Boat asunder, and again joining her in the Middle with fresh Timber, she being otherwise incapable of carrying so large a Number.

F. In what Part of the Globe you have been round is this Island situated?

V. 'Tis one of the *Ladrones*, which lie in a Range from North to South near 30 Degrees East of *Manilla* in the *Philippines*. In some Maps you will find it at about 15 Degrees North Latitude.

F. And are all these *Ladrones* uninhabited?

V. *Guam*, the principal, South of *Timan*, is inhabited by a few *Spaniards*, who claim the Property indeed of them all, and of all the other Islands in these Seas. But even *Timan*, tho' now desolate, has formerly had more magnificent Masters than those *Wasters of the World*, as appears by the Ruins of several august and venerable Fabricks, which discover a Taste not unworthy of the greatest *Asian* Majesty.

F. Is the Island itself considerable, either for Magnitude or Fertility?

V. It is not large, but a very Paradise for Beauty and Plenty. I should not have been unwilling to make one in the re-peopling of it, if we had not been all Men, and therefore not capable of enjoying all the Sweets of Society, and continuing our Species.

F. But then you had not taken the rich *Aguapulco* Prize?

V. Nor had we wanted it. However, as it is, and I am safe again in *England*, Thanks to my good Fortune! And Thanks to you for bringing me to another Instance



of our noble Commander's Gallantry, shewn in the very Time of Action with the Spaniards.

R. How and what was that, Sir?

V. As his Honour was upon Deck giving his Orders, one of our Lieutenants came up to him in great Hurry and Confusion, crying out, *Sir! Sir!* The Commodore went on calmly with what he was saying, and then turning to the Lieutenant, *Well, Sir, and what is your Pleasure?* The young Gentleman had hardly Breath or Spirits to bring out, *Why, Sir, the Ship's on Fire!* — But received no other Answer than this very temperate one, *Why then, Sir, go and put it out.* The Ease with which he spoke this, the Serenity he preserv'd in his Countenance (for I was just by him) and the Regularity with which he still carried on the Engagement, were to me admirable, and what I am sure I shall never forget.

F. And what became of the Fire? Or was there any Thing in it?

V. There was; something of the Stores had taken Fire, which might have been of fatal Consequence if not soon extinguished: But the Commander's Temper diffused itself on every one else, which enabled a few to stifle the Danger without Hurry or Noise, or calling the rest of the Men from their Duty; who soon brought the Dons to Submission.

F. Had you before this taken any Thing very considerable?

V. Nothing in Comparison of it, yet sufficient to have pass'd for a Compensation of any moderate Cruize. I was myself one of the 50 Men who sack'd and burnt the Town of *Payta*, upon the Coast of *Peru*, where we brought off to the Value of 32,000*l.* Sterling in Specie, besides some other small Pickings. We had a few more little Matters at other Times; but wanted Strength to make any capital Attempt, as was at first intended.

F. I should be glad to hear the Particulars of some of those little Matters you mention.

V. The principal was, a Ship of about 200 Tons Burden, in our Passage between *Fernandez Isles* and *Payta*. She had on board her to the Value of 13,000*l.* Sterling in Specie.

F. They tell us of some Persons of Distinction taken at the same Time: Pray, what were they?

V. There were, among others, two beautiful *Spanish Ladies*, whom we afterwards landed at *Payta*.

F. We have an Old Ballad of a *Spanish Lady*, how she loved an *Englishman*: Did not the Presence of these Fair ones give Birth to some Scenes of Gallantry after your Distress?

V. Not in the least; we were all *Scipio's*. Never were Prisoners treated with more Generosity by every Gentleman, from the Commodore down to the meanest Officer: And as to the Sailors, they were not suffered to have the least Opportunity of offering them either Injury or Affront.

[To be concluded in our next.]

*Westminster Journal*, Sept. 15. and 22.

JAPAN and GREAT BRITAIN compar'd, as to their Situation, true Interest, and Politicks.

WE know that *Japan* is a Cluster of Islands, the largest of which, by our Geographers called *Nippon*, appears among them with as much Distinction as *Great Britain* among the *British Isles*; that *Bongo*, tho' not quite so big in Proportion, may pass for the *Ireland of Japan*; and that *Japan* is divided from *Corea*; a Part of the *Chinese Empire*, which is the *France of Asia*, by a Streight not comparatively wider, with respect to the Magnitude of the Countries, than that which divides *European France* from *South Britain*. We have long known, that the *Japoneses* are a trading People, excellent in many Arts; and yet that they have no great Union with this mighty Empire of *China*, nor with any of the other Countries.

Let us figure to ourselves an *Englishman* in *Japan*, with a general Map or Globe of the best Kind, and an ingenious *Bonze*, or rather Merchant, attentive to have a true Notion of the several Parts of the Earth. Methinks I should hear something like the following Dialogue.

*Jap.* By what I can perceive, there is a greater Conformity between your Country and this, than between any other two on the Globe. Your Engraver has indeed honestly made *Japan* the biggest, as undoubtedly it is: We are also several Degrees warmer, which must be an Addition to our Happiness: But what I admire in both is, our Separation from the Continent, and yet Vicinity to it; whereby we have equally the Advantage of trading with all the Countries round us, keeping the small ones in a State of Dependency and Awe, and living without Dread from the largest; and yet not interfering with the Affairs of either, otherwise than we see it for our own Benefit.

*Eng.* A very great Advantage indeed, if properly improved: But do you *Japoneses* live in this Manner?

*Jap.* Can you doubt it, after viewing our Situation? We have an Opinion in these Eastern Parts, that we are much wi-

fer than you in the West: But you must think us infinitely greater Fools than yourselves, if we did not make the same Advantage of this special Favour of Heaven.

*Eng.* You seem a little too hasty in your Conclusions concerning us, without knowing what we are. Did I say we aw'd all our weak Neighbours, and liv'd without Dread of the Stronger?

*Jap.* I cannot say you directly told me this: But after preaching up the Felicity of your Country, and then shewing me what that Country is in Extent and Situation, I could not conclude less. The Judgment I am sure is natural, and I dare believe true.

*Eng.* Is that a safe Method of arguing, think you?

*Jap.* We *Japanese* generally find it so. Do you find it otherwise?

*Eng.* I must own we have not this plain Method of conducting ourselves and our Affairs: We have what we call a complex Interest, a common Interest, the Interest of the general System of *Europe*; and we are infinitely more industrious in promoting this, than what immediately and separately concerns ourselves.

*Jap.* Pray, make me sensible what this complex common Interest is, for which you are so much concerned, tho' it seems but little to concern you.

*Eng.* This is indeed a difficult Task; it is subject to great Variations, and your great Politicians only can determine how the Balance changes, and into what Scale they ought to throw the Weight, in order to preserve the Equilibre.

[The rest in our next.]

ARTICLES of the Treaty of UNION concluded at *Frankfort*, May 22, 1744, between the Emperor, the King of *Prussia* as Elector of *Brandenbourg*, the Elector Palatine, and the King of *Sweden* as Landgrave of *Hesse*.

I. THE great End and principal View of this Confederation is to be, that all the Holy Roman Empire should be preserved in its accustomed Constitution, conformably to the Treaty of Peace of *Westphalia*, and to the other fundamental Laws of the Empire, that Peace and Tranquillity should be re-establish'd in *Germany*, and that the Preservation of the Rank, Dignity, and Imperial Power be maintained.

II. The most High and High Allies oblige themselves to employ all the good Offices imaginable at the Court of *Vienna*, to the End that, in the first Place, it may be induced to acknowledge his Imperial Majesty, now reigning, as Chief of the Empire; to deliver up the Archives of the Empire,

which it detains still at *Vienna*; and afterwards, by Way of Preliminary, to restore to his Imperial Majesty, his Electoral, Hereditary, and Patrimonial Country, which it with-holds from him to this Time, contrary to the Union heretofore established among the Electors of the Empire.

A III. The most High and High Allies, with regard to the Debates about the *Austrian* Succession, have agreed, that the Differences which have arisen hitherto in the Empire, in relation thereto, shall be either accommodated in a friendly Manner, by the Mediation of all the States of the Empire, or terminated by a judicial Decision; but that, till such Time as this may be compass'd, a general Armistice in *Germany* shall be stipulated.

B IV. The most High and High Allies guaranty to one another all and each of the States and Countries they are actually in Possession of.

V. In case that any one of the most High and High Confederates, should, upon Account of this Union, be attacked in the Countries that he actually possesses, the said most High and High Confederates oblige themselves to come, without any Delay to the Succour of the injured Party, to assist him with all their Forces, and to continue that Assistance to him, till they have procured him a full and effectual Indemnification on the Part of the Aggressor.

D VI. And as this Union of the Confederates tends solely to the Advantage of the whole Empire, it shall be free for all Electors, Princes and States, to accede thereto, to which shall be particularly invited, and principally amongst others, his Electoral Highness of *Cologne*, his Polish Majesty as Elector of *Saxony*, and his Serene Highness the Duke of *Bavaria*, Bishop of *Leige*.

Charles VII. &c. [the whole Title.]

As we have learnt that a certain anonymous Piece, printed at *Vienna*, is dispersed in the Empire, pretending that there is a separate Article to the Treaty of Union concluded between us and the Electors or Princes and Confederates, you [i. e. the Imperial Ministers at foreign Courts] are to declare every where, that there is nothing omitted, nor added, in the Treaty of Union, in the Manner it is here inserted, and that it does not contain any separate Article, and that consequently all that is advanced concerning it in the Paper from *Vienna*, is invented and absolutely false.

At *Frankfort*,  
August 31, 1744.



The PROTESTATION. Set by Mr. Boyce. 459

No more shall meads be deckt with flowers, nor sweetness  
dwell in rosy bow'rs, nor greenest buds in  
branches spring, nor warbling birds delight to sing,  
nor April violets paint the grove, if I forsake my Celia's  
love, if I forsake my Celia's love.

2.  
The fish shall in the ocean burn,  
And fountains sweet shall bitter turn;  
The humble vale no flood shall know,  
When floods shall highest hills o'erflow;  
Black Lethe shall oblivion leave,  
If e'er my Celia I deceive.

3.  
Love shall his bow and shaft lay by,  
And Venus' doves want wings to fly;  
The sun refuse to shew his light,  
And day be turned into night;  
And in that night no star appear,  
If e'er I leave my Celia dear.

*The Marriage of so publick-spirited a Man as Gen. OGLETHORPE, may render the Revival of the following beautiful Ode no Ways disagreeable to those of our Readers, who have a Taste for Poetry.*

## A PINDARIC ODE.

To JAMES OGLETHORPE, Esq; in the Country. Written in the Year 1728.

## I.

ARISE, and soar, my tow'ring soul,  
To flights of lofty Pindar's song,  
When, scorning laws, his torrents roll  
Their dithyrambick tide along:  
No fall, like Icarus, I fear,  
Who dar'd with artful pinions fly;  
Me stronger nature shall up-bear;  
Nor follower, but a rival, I.

## II.

Tho' long extinct Apollo's rage,  
And lost is Aganippe's stream,  
Nature, the same in every age,  
Still shines, my unexhausted theme;  
Whether her favour deign to crown  
Some darling son with wit refin'd,  
Or wisdom show'r, and virtue, down,  
Those glories of the human mind!

## III.

Or else her pencil she prepare  
For Spring's returning scene,  
To paint imitably fair  
The fields with living green;  
Her gawdy bow aloft to spread,  
When clouds their treasure pour,  
Or earth embroider, for our tread,  
With beauties of the flower.

## I.

Wisely from smog and noise remov'd,  
Each morn you view, with ravish'd eye,  
The country sweet, by poets lov'd,  
Which fancy must to me supply.  
On breezes vernal odours float,  
The dew-drops glitter on the spray,  
The feather'd songsters swell their note,  
And the sun smiles, and you are gay!

## II.

Senates, supreme on earth, we see,  
Bid new-built temples threat the skies,  
Whitehall itself, at their decree,  
Improv'd might from its ashes rise.  
But say, would all their art and care  
One single vegetable show?  
With cowslips scent perfume the air,  
Or teach the haw-thorn how to blow?

## III.

Did fortune answer to my mind,  
My wishes to my love,  
No need of invitations kind,  
To lead me to the grove,  
Where nature's works I might admire,  
Free from the city's crowd,  
And from the art of man retire,  
To view the art of God.

## I.

Vast navies, built by human skill,  
The pilot's wond'rous art obey;  
The oak deserts its native bill,  
O'er ocean's liquid world to stray:  
Yet vain the ship-wright's boasted pride,  
The chart or compass nought avails,  
If nature joins not with her tide,  
Nor lends assistance with her gales.

## II.

From pole to pole our squadrons go,  
Excelling ancient fables far,  
Of Argo, when a ship below,  
Or when exalted to a star:  
Preserv'd from rocks and storms in vain,  
Laden with wealth or fame they come;  
Shou'd erring counsellors ordain,  
They suffer shipwreck here at home.

## III.

Them, virtue rises to defend,  
In spite of numbers bold,  
See avarice a-while suspend  
Its wonted thirst of gold!  
What pride or fraud may have design'd,  
See reason over-bear!  
And fleets a port of safety find,  
If Oglethorpe is there.

## I.

The pious, grateful duty owes  
To the dear land, where he was born,  
A glorious debt! which nature knows  
With fairest int'rest to return.  
He merits first his country's praise,  
Who steers her helm through danger on,  
And he deserves the second place,  
Who guards her safety with a son.

## II.

'Twas thus the father of my friend  
Wisely secur'd a lasting fame,  
Beyond the reach of death t' extend  
His publick and domestick name.  
'Tis single, 'tis imperfect light,  
The world from worth unwedded shares;  
He only shines compleatly bright,  
Who leaves his virtues to his heirs.

## III.

Oh thus too may his offspring haste  
His glory to improve,  
And, fir'd by love to Britain, taste  
The bliss of private love!  
With joy his summons I attend,  
And fly, with speed, away;  
Let but the patriot condescend  
To fix his marriage-day.

## IRELAND.

FAR westward lies an isle of ancient fame,  
By nature bless'd, Hibernia is her name.  
Enroll'd in books, exhaustless in her store  
Of veiny silver, and of golden ore.  
Her fruitful soil forever teems with wealth,  
With gems her waters, and her air with  
health:

Her



Her verdant fields with milk and honey flow,  
Her woolly fleeces vie with virgin snow;  
Her waving furrows float with bearded corn,  
And arms and arts her envy'd sons adorn.  
No savage bear with lawless fury roves,  
No ravenous lion thro' her peaceful groves.  
No poison there infects, no scaly snake  
Creeps thro' the grass, nor frog annoys the lake.

An island worthy of its pious race,  
In war triumphant, and unmatched in peace.

*Tho' the following lines, sent us some Time ago, seem to contain some reflection on Mr. Pope; yet, as they preserve a due Regard to his Memory, and as many People have thought him sometimes too beautifully severe, we have thought fit to insert them.*

VERSES occasioned by the Death of  
ALEXANDER POPE, Esq;

WHEN some high monarch mingles  
with the dust,

His grateful people rear the polish'd bust;  
The conscious marble but records a name,  
To sound the ruler's and the hero's fame;  
His private virtues seldom are reveal'd,  
His faults in dark oblivion lie conceal'd.  
Here justice tamely yields her right away,  
And partial custom bears a rigid sway.

In this, how blest would be the poet's lot!  
His keen reflections and mistakes forgot!  
But, ah! th' inimitable lines remain,  
An endless monument! a lasting stain!  
Could these be rescu'd from the age to come,

[the tomb;  
The sorrowing muse would thus inscribe  
"Pope dies! Britannia groans beneath her  
"wound!

"And Europe echoes to the mournful sound!  
"The sons of learning huddle at the stroke!  
"And universal goodness feels a shock!"

*On making FOUL-ISLAND, after a bad Voyage, North about, from Charles-Town, South-Carolina, to England.*

FOUL winds, foul weather vex'd us sore,  
And foul'd with grief each blithsome soul;

With fouler luck to vex us more,  
The very land we make is Foul!

*Written extempore in the Castle of Edinburgh, June 9, 1744.*

WINDSOR, no more thy chearing  
views invite. [sight!  
What joyful prospects glad my straining

\* However, to do Justice, 'tis no bad Landfall, though we thought to make Fair-Isle.  
† James I. ‡ Edinburgh.

Hail, Scotia's sons, who restless ever roam,  
Far from your native skies, delightful home:  
Ill you requite the providential care,  
That bless'd your land, with all that's great  
and fair.

What distant scenes of golden plenty rise,  
What hills and dales and glitt'ring domes }  
surprise,

And gaily charm each fond beholder's eyes!  
See gaudy Fife's eternal towered sides,  
'Gainst which the Frits, tumultuous roll  
their tides. [land,

Well might the merry monarch † call the  
Whose num'rous towns enliven all the  
strand,

And all around the blithsome shire embrace,  
A velvet cloak su' richly edg'd with lace.

Yon reverend town†, whole ev'ry lofty spire,  
And antique fabrics sacred awe inspire,  
The seat of royal kings, a lengthen'd line,  
Tho' with a faded lustre, still does shine.

Where ere I turn me to the magic round,  
Ten thousand various wonders still are  
found. [tongue

Let malice own, that long with carping  
Has scorn'd thy charms, with baleful envy  
stung, [pare;

Thy beauties, so despis'd, are past com-  
Thy men all valiant, and thy women fair.  
Ah! tho' oppress'd, let ev'ry nation see  
Thy patriot sons unbias'd, bold and free.

P. V. C. ANGLICUS.

*Written on a Brick, in the Ruins of HOLY-  
ABBEY, on HOLY-ISLAND, near Ber-  
wick on Tweed, June 21, 1744.*

YE gloomy vaults, ye hoary cells,  
Ye cloyster'd domes, in ruin great,  
Where sad and mournful silence dwells,  
How well instruct ye by your fate?

Thus ev'ry human pride and boast  
Shall soon or later meet decay;  
In dark oblivion sunk and lost,  
The idle pageants of a day.

Ah! what is life! a passing hour!  
A fleeting dream of fancy'd joy!  
No constant blessing in our power,  
But dullest repetitions cloy.

How frail, how weak is human art,  
By works like these, to raise a name!  
What empty vapours swell the heart!  
On what strange plans we build for  
fame!

'Tis virtue only laughs at age,  
And soars beyond the reach of time,  
Mocks at the tyrant's fiercest rage,  
For ever awfully sublime.

P. V. C.

## EPIGRAM.

**M**enedemus the stoic, once heartily jaded,  
By a fool, whose strange nonsense  
his ears had invaded;  
Ask'd him furiously, if an estate he possess'd?  
Or if with a round sum of gold he was  
blest'd? [your cares  
He answer'd him, both: then go use all  
To preserve, free from ruin, those weighty  
affairs; [damnable matter,  
For, if fortune should frown, 'twere a  
For tho' rich fools may prate, poor ones  
never must chatter. [edly dull,  
Hear this, my Lord — who're so curs-  
And Colonel —, thou conceited old  
cull;  
For if fortune had ne'er giv'n you titles and  
pelf, [damn'd, by himself.  
You might each of you scheme, and be  
P. V. DEMOCRITUS.

## SONG. To a new Tune.

## I.

**W**HAT fest'ning transports melt my  
soul,  
When *Sakey* glads my sight!  
What floods of rapture o'er me row!  
What joy, what sweet delight!  
But, lovely maid, the constant flame,  
That warms my faithful breast,  
No censuring voice will dare to blame,  
Nor sour dislike suggest.

## II.

By virtue rais'd from base desire,  
I view thy heavenly mind,  
And reason tempers passion's fire,  
That lords it o'er mankind.  
Thy mind, all spotless as thy face,  
In native radiance fair,  
No affectations ere disgrace,  
No trifles harbour there.

## III.

To win thy heart, with studious pain  
Each distant clime I roam;  
More perfect merit still to gain,  
I fly my native home.  
Each fardid notion far exil'd,  
More gen'rous still and true;  
Should weakness dwell where *Sakey* smil'd,  
Should ign'rance league with you?

## IV.

No, charming girl, you still convey  
New science to my eyes;  
Your ev'ry sentence points the way,  
By which your swain should rise:  
Should rise to that most happy state,  
At which my wishes aim,  
Thy heart to share, thy bliss create,  
And prove my tender flame.

1743

K.

## PHILLIS; or the SHEPHERD'S INVITATION.

## I.

**T**HE morning fresh, the sun in east,  
New-gilds the smiling day;  
The lark forsakes his dewy nest,  
The fields around are gaily drest,  
Arise, my love! and play,  
and play,  
Arise, my love! and play.

## II.

Come forth, my fair! come forth, bright  
maid!  
And bless thy shepherd's sight;  
Lend ev'ry folded flow'r thy aid,  
Unveil the roses blushing shade,  
And give them sweet delight,  
delight,  
And give them sweet delight.

## III.

Beneath the fragrant hawthorn-tree  
The flow'ry wreath I'll twine;  
Ere other eyes their beauties see,  
They on thy brow adorn'd shall be;  
The happy task be mine,  
be mine,  
The happy task be mine.

Z. Z.

On the Death of Mr. JACOB BINLEY, of  
the County of Chester, who died August  
14, 1744, aged 19.

## I.

**L**AMENTED youth, what cruel fate,  
Envious of thy happy state,  
Hath snatch'd thee from the light?  
With fury seiz'd what jealous pow'r  
Could pluck the sweetest, fairest flow'r,  
That cheer'd our ravish'd sight.

## II.

Lo! one adorn'd with ev'ry grace,  
His mind as beaut'ous as his face,  
A victim fall to death.  
Nor mournful sigh, nor friendly tear  
Could heav'n incline our prayers to hear,  
Or stop his fleeting breath.

## III.

Fix'd is our term of years, in vain  
At heav'n's decree doth man complain,  
In vain we sigh and mourn.  
Sooner or later all must die,  
The old and young together lie  
In one capacious urn.

## IV.

Yet though on earth thou cease to live,  
Thy better part shall still survive,  
Thy name forever last;  
The Muse shall sing aloud thy praise,  
A standing monument shall raise,  
Which time shall never blast.

JOHN SUNHURST.

THE



# T H E Monthly Chronologer.

*The Emperor's Commissarial Decree, transmitted, Aug. 25, by the Directory of Mentz, to the Dyet of the Empire.*



IN the Part of his Imperial Majesty of the Romans, *Charles VII.* our most gracious Sovereign;

His Highness Prince *Alexander Ferdinand de la Tour and Taxis*, &c. principal Imperial Commissary, ought not to conceal from the most illustrious Counsellors, Embassadors, and Envoys here present, of the Electors, Princes, and States of the Empire, the most ample Proof his *Prussian* Majesty has given of his *German* and Patriot-like Resolution, in regard to the obstinate Refusal of the Court of *Vienna*, to listen even to the most equitable Offers, which have not only been propos'd, but press'd upon her in the gentlest Manner, and yet with the warmest Sollicitations; exposing thereby the Empire to utter Subversion, and that too under the most deplorable Circumstances: Most magnanimously, to his unextinguishable Glory, and to the great Augmentation of the Merits of his most Serene House towards the *German* Nation, for advancing the Welfare of the whole Nation, for supporting the Prerogatives of its Supreme Head, his Authority, and his Dignity, and for restoring that Tranquillity which is so much desir'd, he has sent to his Imperial Majesty's Assistance a numerous Body of Troops, which have acted powerfully on his Behalf already.

As his Imperial Majesty has successively, during the whole Time of his glorious Imperial Reign, reiterated and confirmed, by his effective Conduct, his *German* and paternal Declarations, that he aim'd at nothing more than to maintain his Rights and Prerogatives, principally, for the Sake of procuring universal Prosperity to the Empire, and to maintain its Constitution unhurt; and consequently, is far enough from contributing, in any Thing, to its Disadvantage; or from being dispos'd, as has been most calumniously reported, to the Secularization of certain high Chapters; and, on the contrary, is entirely inclin'd to preserve and protect every one in his Possessions, Rights and Prerogatives, and would willingly make Satisfaction to

all such as have any lawful Pretensions upon him; as he is oblig'd, without Dispute, by the law of God; and his own solemn Engagements, to do, without calling in any third Party to pay for him.

His Imperial Majesty is too much persuaded of the Love and Zeal of the Electors, Princes and States, for the general Prosperity of their dear Country of *Germany*; for his Majesty, as its supreme Head; for the Lustre and Authority of the Empire, as it is here represented; for the unalterable Support of the Laws of the Empire, and that indissoluble Bond which ought to be between the supreme Head and its Members; as also amongst themselves, for preserving the universal Tranquillity of the Empire, and of all well-meaning *Germans*, not to have the fullest Confidence, that all the Electors, Princes and States, in general, and every one in particular, will most gloriously follow this magnanimous Example; and as his before-mentioned Royal Majesty has taken this vigorous Resolution with no other View than to fulfil his Obligations, and from a Patriot-like Care for the Prosperity of his Country, that in like Manner, they will be as careful, in respect to the Fidelity of their precious Engagements, to his Imperial Majesty, that they will attach themselves indissolubly to their supreme Head, according to the Example set them by him, and other well-meaning Electors and Princes; and, in Effect, join with united Forces for the Deliverance and Security of the most precious System of the Empire, which has subsisted for so many Ages; and, at the same Time, will not refuse, as true *Germans*, to concur, in general, and in particular, to the Advancement and Preservation of the Prosperity of their dear Country, as is their indispensable Duty, in Quality of Electors, Princes and States.

*Frankfort, Aug. 22, 1744.*

(L. S.) *Alexander P. of Tour and of Taxis.*

On the 28th of last Month the Justices of the Peace, and Commissioners of the Land-Tax, for the County of *Middlesex*, met at *Hick's-Hall*, pursuant to a Letter from the Right Hon. Sir *William Yonge*, Bart. his Majesty's Secretary at War; when Warrants were issued to the several Constables for impressing able-bodied Landmen for his Majesty's Service.

On

On the 30th, the Treasure taken in the *Aguapulco* Ship by Commodore Anson, was divided amongst the Captors, which amounted to 171 l. each common Sailor's Share, exclusive of the Treasure taken in the *South-Seas*.

The same Day *William Mace*, Esq; was chosen by the Master, Wardens, and a Committee of the *Mercers Company*, Professor of the Civil Law at *Gresham College*, in the Room of *Mr. Cummings*, deceased.

TUESDAY, Sept. 4.

Orders were issued out for putting the several Castles, Forts, &c. on the Coasts of *Great Britain* in a Posture of Defence; they are to be reinforced with 100 Men each, and provided with all Manner of military Stores.

FRIDAY, 7.

The Claims of the Officers belonging to the *Gloucester* Man of War, upon the *Aguapulco* Prize, taken by Commodore Anson, were expected to have been adjusted this Day in *Doctors-Commons*: But after opening the Cause, the farther Hearing of it was put off to another Opportunity, on Account of the Absence of some of the Witnesses. — The Case of these Gentlemen is this: They were taken on board the *Centurion*, on the foundering of their own Ship, and so were present at the Action off *Luconia*, whereby they claim as Officers, according to their former Rank: But the *Centurion's* Gentlemen, as all the Offices in their Ship were fill'd with their own People, deny their being consider'd in that Capacity, and say they ought to share only with the common Men; because there can not be Duplicates to the same Post on one Ship.

THURSDAY, 13.

Admiral *Davers* hoisted his Flag on board the *Cornwall* at *Spithead*, having thirteen Ships of the Line under his Command, in order to sail, together with the Store-ships, for *Jamaica*.

SATURDAY, 15.

The Sessions ended at the *Old Baily*, when the 7 following Malefactors received Sentence of Death, viz. *John Macarvey* and *Luke Riley*, for assaulting *William Hall* on the Highway, near *Frog-Lane*, and robbing him of 4 l. and for several other Robberies on the Highway, no less than 30 Indictments being found against them: *Joseph Peirson* and *Joseph Fitzwalter* (two Boys under 15 Years of Age) for knocking down and robbing *Henry Jones* of 5 s. in *West-Smithfield*: *William Lawrence*, for stealing a Lamb: *Thomas Wright* (a Boy) for assaulting *Mrs. Pennington*, putting a Pistol to her Breast, and robbing her of Goods to 7 s. Value: *Thomas Bonnell*, for assaulting and robbing two Women in *Hackney-Fields*. — Robbing in Gangs is be-

come so frequent in every Part of the Town, as to render it almost unsafe for People to pass the Streets after Day-light; which makes the speedy Suppression of these Villains, who not only rob, but wound, and otherwise abuse his Majesty's good Subjects, absolutely necessary. — A Woman was tried for robbing the *Western Mail*, but acquitted.

TUESDAY, 18.

A very extraordinary Combination having of late been enter'd into, by great Numbers of Journeymen Taylors and Staymakers (to the Number of 15,000) to advance their Wages above what is limited by Act of Parliament, the Lords of his Majesty's Most Hon. Privy Council wrote a Letter to his Grace the Duke of Newcastle, *Custos Rotulorum* of the County of *Meddlesex*, requiring his Grace to recommend, in the strongest Manner, to the Justices of the said County, to carry into immediate Execution the late Act of Parliament for regulating the Journeymen Taylors within the Weekly Bills of Mortality; and also to revoke the Licences granted to such Publicans as have been concern'd in encouraging their unlawful Combinations and Confederacies. A Letter of the same Import was sent to the Lord Mayor of *London*, &c.

WEDNESDAY, 19.

Admiral *Mathews* arriv'd in Town from the *Mediterranean*.

THURSDAY, 20.

The Parliament was farther prorogu'd to the 27th of *November* next.

A Grant has lately pass'd the Great Seal to the Right Hon. *John Lord Carteret*, one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, of the eighth Part of the Province of *Carolina*; yielding and paying to his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, the annual Rent of 1 l. 13 s. 4 d. on the Feast of *All Saints*, for ever: And also one fourth Part of all Gold and Silver Ore, found within the said eighth Part of the Premises; and to hold to the said *John Lord Carteret*, his Heirs, Executors, &c. to his and their own Use and Benefit, all Arrears of Rent, &c.

The Earl of *Holdernesse*, as he was passing thro' *Germany* to his Embassy at *Pavia*, was arrested by some Imperial Hussars, and not suffer'd to proceed on his Journey, till he had given Lieut. Gen. Count de *German* a Reverfal Letter, that, in case he should be declared Prisoner of War, he would submit to that Condition: But upon his Arrival at *Ratisbon*, he receiv'd an Express from Count *Seckendorf*, with Compliments and Excuses for the Treatment he had met with, and the Paper he was oblig'd to give was return'd to him.

FRIDAY,



TUESDAY, 25.

Mr. Jones, the City Marshal, as he was endeavouring to seize a notorious Rogue, was immediately attack'd by 12 more with Cutlasses and Pistols, and narrowly escap'd with his Life, after demanding some Soldiers who were walking by, in his Majesty's Name, to assist him; upon which the Rogues made off.

FRIDAY, 28.

Mr. Alderman Bernard, and Mr. Alderman Pennant, the Sheriffs Elect, were sworn into that Office at Guildhall.

SATURDAY, 29.

Henry Marshall, Esq; Alderman of the Ward of Faringdon Within, was chosen Lord Mayor of London for the ensuing Year.

## MARRIAGES and BIRTHS.

REV. Mr. Lee Egerton, Rector of Lime in Cheshire, to Miss Sally Egerton. — Ralph Harrison, Esq; possess'd of a plentiful Estate in Berkshire, to Miss Sally Foley, of Kensington. — Col. Cunningham, to Miss Merrick. — Rev. Mr. Prescott, Master of Katharine-Hall in Cambridge, Prebendary of Norwich, and Minister of Great Yarmouth, to Miss Appleyard. — Sam. Sheppard, of Bliffworth in Northamptonshire, Esq; to Miss Sheppard, of Southwark. — The Hon. James Oglethorpe, Esq; Gen. and Commander in Chief of his Majesty's Forces in South-Carolina and Georgia, and Brigadier-General upon the British Establishment, to Elizabeth, the only surviving Heir of the late Sir Nathan Wright, of Cranham-Hall in Essex, Bart. — Rev. Mr. Gibson, Rector of St. Botolph's, Bishopsgate, and Son to the Bishop of London, to Miss Loveday, of Devonshire-Square. — Payne King, Esq; Heir to Dr. King, late Master of the Charter-House, to a Daughter of James Colbrooke, Esq; — Hon. Thomas Cochran, Esq; a Commissioner of the Excise in Scotland, to Miss Jean Stewart. — John Winter, Esq; to Miss Bradbury. — Capt. Baldwin, in the Levant Trade, to Miss Farrant. — The Lady of the Hon. Capt. Boscawen, deliver'd of a Son and Heir. — Countess of Carlisle, of a Daughter. — The Lady of Barnaby Backwell, Esq; of a Son. — Lady Anne Magil, Sister to the Earl of Darnley, of a Daughter.

## DEATHS.

R. T. Hon. David Tew, Esq; Lord Mayor of Dublin. — Dr. Peacock, Physician Gen. to the Army in Ireland. — Capt. Dandridge, Capt. of the Mary Galley. — William Russell, Esq; of Woodford in Essex. — Rev. Mr. Tingley, Chaplain to the late Duke of Chandos. — Rt. Hon. the Lady Dowager Bellemont. — Rev. Dr. Jeremiah Hunt, an eminent and learned Dissenting Minister at Pinners-Hall. — George Ballard, of Leatherhead, Esq; — Rev. Mr. Arthur Lade, a Prebendary of Dublin, and Rector of Denbigh. — Mr. John

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Hendry, of Stockton in the County of Durham. — Richard Vane, Esq; near Terring in Suffolk, aged 86. — Major Belladine, of Henrywood's Reg. of Horse in Flanders. — Michael Newton, Esq; at Langdon in Staffordshire. — Mr. Charles Morbland, Professor of Oriental Languages at Glasgow. — Rev. Mr. George Harbin, formerly of Emanuel-College, Cambridge, Nephew and Chaplain to Dr. Turner, sometime Bp. of Ely. — Thomas Cosbey, Esq; of Oxfordshire. — Mr. Theobald, well known for his several poetical Productions. — Henry Cross, Esq; many Years in the Commission of the Peace for the County of Bucks. — Thomas Gibson, Esq; Memb. of Parli. for Yarmouth in Hants. — Rt. Hon. William Nevill, Lord Abergavenny, Premier Baron of England; succeeded by his Son George, now Lord Abergavenny.

## Ecclesiastical PREFERMENTS.

MR. Huxley, to the Rectory of Sutton, in the Diocese of Litchfield and Coventry. — Young, M. A. to the Living of Cransley, in Northamptonshire. — Mr. Geo. Jaques, to a Prebend in the Cathedral of Wells. — Christopher Wilson, M. A. to the Rectory of Willingale Spain, in Essex. — Mr. Richard Hunt, to the Vicarage of Leyning, in Somersetshire. — Mr. Wilson, to the Rectory of Halstead, in Essex. — Mr. Addison, to the Vicarage of Saxetorpe, in Norfolk, and Rectory of Earl-Stoneham, in Suffolk. — Mr. Ray, to the Rectory of Marlesham, in Suffolk.

[Promotions, &amp;c. in our next.]

## Abstract of the London WEEKLY BILL, from Aug. 28. to Sept. 25.

Christned	Males	574	1055
	Females	481	
Buried	Males	654	1345
	Females	691	
Died under 2 Years old			534
Between	2 and	5	97
	5	10	34
	10	20	49
	20	30	116
	30	40	127
	40	50	154
	50	60	97
	60	70	69
	70	80	43
	80	90	23
	90 and upwards		2

1345

Hay 42 to 45 a Load.

R r r

ON

ON the 12th of last Month, the King of *Prussia*, at the Head of his Army, entered the Kingdom of *Bohemia*, and tho' the Roads had been broken by the *Austrians*, and made as impassable as possible, in order to retard his March, yet as there was no Army, nor any fortified Place to interrupt his Passage, he arrived before *Prague* with the Van-guard of his Army on the 19th; but the heavy Artillery not being arrived, the Place was only blockaded. On the 27th the Train of Artillery coming from *Silesia* was attack'd by a Party of *Austrians*, who beat the Escort, wounded General *Hacke*, its Commander, cut in Pieces the greatest Part of his Regiment, and carried off the Train; but a very strong Detachment being immediately sent from the *Prussian* Army, which the *Austrians* were not able to encounter, they were in their Turn obliged to retreat, and abandon their important Prey. About the same Time, there was a bloody Skirmish at *Beraun*, which the King of *Prussia* intended to have Possession of, and had sent thither six Battalions with eight Pieces of Cannon, and 800 Hussars, for that Purpose; but General *Festinitz* being there with a great Party of his Corps, and M. *Luchesi* with 1000 Horse, they not only repulsed the *Prussians*, but attack'd them in their Turn, and obliged them to retire with considerable Loss. During these Skirmishes in the Neighbourhood, the *Prussian* Artillery, both that from *Silesia*, and that which was brought by the *Elbe* from *Berlin*, arrived in their Camp before *Prague*; and three Attacks were formed against the Place, two on the West Side of the *Moldaw*, one of which was commanded by the King in Person, and the other by Lieut. Gen. *Truchses*, and a third on the East Side, commanded by Felt-Marshal *Schwerin*. As they had a vast Number of Cannon and Mortars mounted upon their Batteries, and play'd incessantly upon the Town with Bombs and red-hot Bullets, by which not only great Breaches were made in the Ramparts, but many Houses set on Fire, or demolished, the Inhabitants began to mutiny, so that the Garison had Reason to fear, that if they stood the Assault, they would be attack'd in the Rear by the mutinous Inhabitants, at the same Time they were attack'd by the Enemy in Front, and as they probably had Orders not to treat the Inhabitants with great Severity, the Commandant found it necessary to beat the *Chamade* on the 15th Instant, N. S. but his *Prussian* Majesty insisting upon the Garison's surrendering Prisoners of War, the Firing was renewed on both Sides, and continued till next Day, by which Time two of the Breaches were made practicable, and the *Prussians* were prepar-

ing to give the general Assault, whereupon the Garison hung out the white Flag again, and surrendered themselves Prisoners of War, being in Number near 16,000 Men, including the irregular Troops and Militia. The 18th the City with all its Dependencies was delivered into his *Prussian* Majesty's Possession, who provisionally appointed Lieutenant General *Einfidel* to be Governor of it. In this Siege the *Prussians* lost but a very few Men, for by their Bombs they drove the Besieged from all the Outworks, so that they were not obliged to make any one Attack, nor did the Besieged make any *Sorti*; their chief Loss being the Prince *Frederick William*, only Brother of the Margrave *Charles*, and Cousin German to the King, who was killed the 12th by a Cannon Ball at his Majesty's Side.

Prince *Charles* of *Lorrain* having marched his Army back from the *Rhine*, and being ordered to come himself to *Vienna*, to assist at a general Council upon the present Posture of Affairs, he arrived there on the 3d Instant, and was to set out again in a few Days for the Army, the greatest Part of which, it was reckon'd, would be arrived upon the Frontiers of *Bohemia* by the 14th, the rest being left in *Bavaria* to oppose Count *Seckendorff*, who is in full March with the Imperial Army from the *Rhine*, in order to recover *Bavaria* for his Imperial Majesty. In the mean Time a great Part of the *French* Army have pass'd the *Rhine*, in order to reduce the *Austrian* Dominions in *Swabia*, where they have already laid Siege to the important Fortrefs of *Fribourg*; another Part of them have joined Count *Seckendorff*, and a third, under the Duke d'*Harcourt*, are marching back towards *Flanders*, from whence we have had as yet no Accounts of any Thing but a few Skirmishes, in which the *French* have generally had the Advantage, and have taken a great Number of Horses from the Allies, especially the *English*; for the rest always take Care to fly so early as to save both their Horses and Men.

Nothing of Importance has happened since our last between the two Armies upon the Frontiers of *Naples*, and as little between those in *Piedmont*, except that the *French* and *Spaniards*, since the taking of *Demont*, have raised vast Contributions in the Valleys of *Piedmont*; and, notwithstanding the Lateness of the Season, have invested *Coni*, having already opened the Trenches before that Place, and are in Hopes to carry it before the Snows begin to fall.

The *Brest* Squadron, by our last Accounts, were in the Mouth of the *Strait*, and as most of the *French* Ships of War at *Toulon*



*Yankee* have at last found Opportunities to get out of that Harbour, and are failed to join the *Spanish* Squadron at *Cartagena*, it is thought, that if all these Squadrons join, the *French* and *Spaniards* will have a Fleet in the *Mediterranean* of upwards of 40 Ships of the Line; so that an Account of another Sea Engagement may soon be expected from that Quarter, for on the 31st past, our Squadron under Sir *John Balchen* was off of *Lisbon*, where he was joined by *Commodore Osborne*, with the *Victuallers* and *Storeships* that have waited so many Months there; and if he and *Admiral Rowley* can unite their Squadrons, we need be under no great Anxiety about the Event of the Engagement; but as the *Enemy's* Fleet lies between them, there will be some Difficulty as to their joining their Squadrons together, because they cannot easily have a Correspondence by Advice-Boats.

We were lately surprised with the News, that the Minister of his *Britannick* Majesty, as *Electors* of *Hanover*, had on the 30th past, carried to the Dictature of the Diet of the Empire at *Frankfort*, a Writing, setting forth, the Pretensions of the *Electoral House* of *Hanover* to the Succession of *East Friesland*, and praying the States to suspend the Vote of that Principality (claimed by the King of *Prussia*, who is now in Possession of the Country) until the Rights of the two Claimants are decided.

The King of *France* has issued Commissions for raising a Regiment of *Scots*, which is to be called the *Royal Scotch*, the Command of which is given to Lord *John Drummond*, Brother to the Duke of *Perth*. They are to have *British* Pay, and the King has granted them the free Exercise of their Religion, and a Renewal of all the Privileges antiently enjoyed by the *Scots* in that Kingdom. This Regiment, they say, is already near compleated by the Deserters from our Army in *Flanders*.

The *Spanish* Squadron has taken near *Cape Palos* nine *Dutch* Ships, loaded, as they pretend, with Ammunition and Stores for the *British* Fleet in the *Mediterranean*, which News has been confirmed by Letters from the *Dutch* Captains to their Owners in *Holland*, who positively deny their having any Thing on board that could be called Contraband. However, notwithstanding this Insult, their High Mightinesses do not yet seem resolved to engage in the War, as may appear from the following Letter wrote by them to the States of the respective Provinces, relating to the Memorial presented by Mr. *Trevor*. (See p. 397.)

Noble and Mighty Lords,

**M**R. *Trevor*, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary from the King of

*Great Britain*, has, by express Command from the King his Master, laid before us a further Memorial, setting forth, that for the several Reasons therein express'd, and seeing that the Term of two Months, stipulated by the Treaty of Alliance Anno 1678, to make use of friendly Offices, has been long since expired, the States should be prevail'd on without Delay to declare War against *France*, and employ all her Forces jointly with those of *Great Britain*, in order to obtain an honourable, just and durable Peace, proposing in his Majesty's Name to consult with us the proper Measures to bring about that so salutary End. Of which Memorial we have thought proper to transmit a Copy to the respective Provinces, as herewith annexed we send one unto you.

Your Noble Mightinesses, and the Lords the States of the other Provinces, already well know, that when his Most Christian Majesty thought proper first to declare War against the King of *Great Britain*, and soon after against the Queen of *Hungary*, their Majesties, as might reasonably be expected, called upon and exhorted the State to comply with its Engagements, which by Treaties subsisted between them, and for that Purpose pressed the Republick to come to an open Rupture with *France*, as is stipulated and promised by the Treaty of 1678, between his *Britannick* Majesty and the States, and by their Accession in the Year 1732, to a Treaty which was concluded the preceding Year, between the late Emperor and the present King of *Great Britain*.

We have by our Letter dated the 2d of *April* last communicated to our respective Confederates the Letter which his *Britannick* Majesty wrote to us; as also by our Letters of the 26th of *June* and 25th of *July* past, those we received from the Queen of *Hungary* on that Subject, together with the provisional Answers which were return'd to each of them.

In those our Letters, we recommended in the strongest Manner, to our respective Confederates, that they would examine and consider the Purport of those Letters with that Attention, which the Importance of the Subject Matter contained in them, demanded: That they would duly weigh what is thereby requested of them, pursuant to the Treaties now in Force: And that with all possible Unanimity, Cordiality, and Dispatch, they would pass such Resolutions as they should judge most effectual in the then present Conjuncture, consistent with the Faith of Treaties, and most conducive to the real Welfare of the State.

However, during the Time these weighty Matters were left to your Consideration, and we were waiting to receive the Resolutions taken by our respective Confederates on

on this important Occasion, we have not been idle, but have employ'd the two Months stipulatd by the Treaty, in using our best Offices, to gain what was reasonable and desirable, rather by reconciling of Differences, than by Force of Arms. For this Purpose, we sent M. *Wafnaer* to the Court of *France*; but, much to our Affliction, we have been so unfortunate, that our Representations have not had the wish'd for Success, and our good Intentions have been absolutely frustrated, M. *Wafnaer* having return'd from *France*, without being able to succeed in his Negotiations at that Court, or prevail with it to suspend their military Operations in the *Netherlands*; but, on the contrary, the *French* Troops have attack'd and taken several Barrier Towns belonging to the State, and garison'd by its Troops, in Violation of the most solemn Treaties, which subsist between the Crown of *France* and the Republick,

During this Situation of Affairs new Difficulties have arose, on which Account his *Britannick* Majesty repeats what before had been very strongly insisted on, the Fulfilling of and thorough Compliance with our En-

gagements, which is indeed the whole Port of Mr. *Trevor's* Memorial.

As the Subject Matter of this Memorial and its Consequences are of the highest Importance, and therefore merit the most mature Consideration, as they tend to nothing less than the Preservation of the Liberties of *Europe*, from which that of our Republick is inseparable, we find ourselves obliged once more to intreat you our Confederates in the most affectionate and most earnest Manner, always having in View the publick Welfare, and the Preservation of our dear Country, to weigh well the aforesaid Memorial, together with the Reasons and Motives therein contained, as also what is thereby requested of us. Let no Time be lost in your Deliberations, but acquaint us as soon possible with your Resolutions; the present Crisis demands it.

In the mean time we pray the Almighty to direct and bless all your Councils, to inspire you with Wisdom and Resolution so necessary in this perplex'd and perilous Situation of Affairs, for the Preservation of his Holy Religion, and our dear Country. Done at the *Hague*, &c."

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[The rest of the Books in our next.]